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Executive summary
The role of religion in conlict and peacebuilding has all too often been 
depicted in binary terms: it is seen as a source either of violence or of 
reconciliation. This simpliication obscures the complexity of the subject 
and shows that there is no common understanding of the central terms 
of the debate. As a starting point for a more meaningful analysis, this 
report aims to ind a workable deinition of ‘religion’ – a concept that is 
frequently applied to a diverse range of situations, institutions, ideolo-
gies and actors. Most recent efforts to deine religion have focused on 
how it is understood and experienced by individuals, rather than how 
it is assessed by institutions or doctrines. By observing how religion 
operates and interacts with other aspects of human experience at the 
global, institutional, group and individual levels, we can gain a more 
nuanced understanding of its role (or potential role) in both conlict 
and peacebuilding.
The major part of this report comprises a literature review, which aims 
to synthesise contributions from a variety of academic disciplines, 
including politics and international relations, peace and conlict stud-
ies, theology, history, philosophy, sociology, social psychology, security 
and terrorism studies. The report also draws on research and relevant 
publications from faith-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). 
Three conlicts that have shown some religious dimension are 
examined as case studies, namely those in Israel-Palestine, Mali and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We identify the concepts, actors and arguments 
at play in each instance, and show in what ways and to what extent 
different aspects of religion were implicated either in the violence 
or in the building of peace, or both. We ind that religious factors 
and motivations vary in each case, supporting our contention that 
when it comes to understanding their role in situations of conlict, 
context is crucial.
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This report puts forward several recommendations for policymakers, 
particularly those involved in conlict resolution or mediation, and 
for scholars in the ield. Underpinning them all is our key inding 
that religion is never a static or isolated entity, but should rather be 
understood as a luid system of variables, contingent upon a large 
number of contextual and historical factors. It is rarely easy to discern 
the complex ways in which religion permeates a conlict, but it is vital 
for those involved in this area of study and diplomacy to strive to do 
so if progress is to be made in understanding them. Finally, a word of 
caution: we must be careful not to give undue prominence to religion 
in all instances; it is not a major factor in every conlict and there is 
a risk that it can sometimes come to obscure more deeply rooted 
causes and motivations.
1. Introduction
This project does not attempt to provide a deinitive answer to the 
extremely dificult questions of whether religion is a cause of conlict, 
and if so, how the faith-based violence that has plagued the opening 
of this new Millennium can be stemmed. Instead, it relects on the 
interpretive lenses and language that we use for dealing with these 
questions. It is also a modest attempt at providing some intellectual 
tools for grappling with the multifaceted concept of ‘religion’ in contexts 
of conlict and peacebuilding around the world. 
We seek to examine and analyse the relationships between faith and 
conlict, without producing an encyclopaedic review of existing literature 
focusing these terms, or on the understanding of violence among world 
belief systems. The aim is to identify features of religion, as well as the 
interpretive trends put forward by scholars that share an interest in simi-
lar questions but come from diverse disciplinary ields. We hope that 
this effort will not just make an academic contribution to a burgeoning 
ield, but will also address real and pressing concerns faced by policy-
makers and the general public alike. This is particularly important as the 
international community has gradually shed its ‘secularist scepticism’ 
and has awakened, in the course of the past 20 years, to the realisa-
tion that ‘religion matters’ in diplomacy and foreign affairs (see among 
others: Johnston and Sampson 1995; Johnston 2003; Thomas 2005; 
Hill 2013; UNFPA 2014; Mandaville and Silvestri 2015). 
In this endeavour, however, caution is needed not to exaggerate religion 
as a cause of violence. As Cavanaugh (2009) has pointed out, much of 
the current debate on religion and violence, and on the religion versus 
secularism dichotomy, is based on incoherent understandings of religion 
and of religious violence, and of how the latter differentiates from secular 
violence. Focusing on the ‘myth’ of religious violence, he warns, prevents 
us from tackling violence and the different conditions, ideologies, 
practices and symbolism under which it emerges and spreads.
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We hope that the indings of this report will be useful to those promot-
ing peace in different social, economic and political settings around the 
world, and in particular for the UK government at a time when religion, 
in one form or another, appears to be entangled in a large number of 
international conlicts and zones of instability.
2. Deinitions
2.1. Religion: part of the problem
Terms such as ‘religiosity’, ‘spirituality’, ‘faith’, ‘belief’, ‘transcendence’, 
‘sacred’, ‘sense of belonging’, ‘culture’, and ‘identity’ are all components 
in the idea of – and have sometimes been used synonymously with – 
religion, but in fact they all have distinct meanings. Like its supposed 
counterpart, secularism, the notion of religion is a relatively recent 
social and intellectual construction of the West, and in particular 
a product of the Reformation. Based on a theological construction of 
authority in reference to a book (MacCulloch 2004), the idea of religion 
became a function of power relations (Asad 1993; Thomas 2005; 
Philpott 2001; Shakman Hurd 2007), and according to Oxford historian 
Diarmaid MacCulloch (2004), a concept imposed on human behaviour 
by Christianity and especially its Protestant variant. In fact, as he has 
highlighted, the Protestant concept of religion became an instrument 
of intellectual hegemony because of the spectacular reach and 
power of the British Empire and the United States (US). The religious 
appellative ‘Hinduism’, for example, is but an invention of the British 
Protestants administering India in the early nineteenth century as they 
were coming to terms with the rich variety of cultures, philosophies, 
spiritual practices and observances of the sub-continent.
In reality, religion is not static, but is constantly being reconigured 
(Cavanaugh 2009; Woodhead 2011). Despite the absence of a universal 
deinition, it is possible to identify some broad and common ways of 
understanding religion. The ‘substantive’ approach looks at the content 
of religion, that is, key scriptures, theologies, bodies of doctrine, and 
values and beliefs enshrined in these. Complementary to this is the 
‘functional’ approach, which highlights what religion ‘does’ to people, 
such as providing them with sources of identity, morality, law and order, 
or by linking them together into communities. Rather than elaborating 
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a single cohesive notion of religion, though, each of these two 
approaches in turn points to a number of multifarious concepts.
It is therefore not surprising that in the current debate in the humanities 
and social sciences about the rediscovered vitality and signiicance 
of religion in contemporary societies, three important questions need 
to be raised. The irst is whether we can reach an exhaustive deinition 
of what is commonly called religion, faith, or sacred? If so, what would 
be its constituent elements? And third, what are the most appropriate 
concepts, objects, and methodological and interpretive parameters to 
use in the study of religion? 
These questions are even more important for those seeking to establish 
the role of religion in situations of conlict and peacemaking/peacebuild-
ing. This paper does not attempt to provide a new scholarly deinition for 
religion. Rather, it aims to establish a practical understanding of what 
is commonly called ‘religion’ and what that entails, essential to any 
analysis of whether features of this phenomenon matter in triggering, 
averting, or mitigating conlict, and if so, which ones. 
Most commonly, religion is understood to be a system of beliefs 
and values associated with particular organisational forms (e.g. ritual 
practices, institutions), and with a supra-natural deity embodying and 
emanating some absolute truths. However, such an understanding 
fails to capture those traditions (especially Asian) that do not revolve 
around a single God and tend to function as philosophies of life. In such 
contexts, religion is best deined as ‘a conceptual and moral framework 
for understanding and ordering lives and communities’ (Skidmore 2007, 
4). Moreover, even when a divinity, beliefs, doctrine and institutions 
are clearly identiiable, focusing only on these elements will still not 
be enough to permit a deeper and sophisticated appreciation of the 
power of religion. This is because the ‘substantive’ approach to religion 
ought to be complemented by a ‘functional’ one, looking at how faith 
is articulated in practice, considering if and how it affects individual 
or groups’ behaviour, thoughts and choices. In analysing religious 
fundamentalism, for instance, Ernest Gellner (1992, 3) argues that what 
really matters is not doctrine but ritual, loyalty to procedural rules and 
celebration of community. Following various scholars, including Duffy 
(2004) and Thomas (2005), we can conclude that the experiential level 
(i.e. experiencing shared values and commitment) is as important, 
or perhaps even more important than the intellectual and cognitive 
dimension of faith. 
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Increased awareness of the Western origins of the concept of ‘religion’ 
and its inextricable links with the idea and processes of secularism 
and secularisation (see among others: Taylor 2007; Asad 1993, 2003; 
MacCulloch 2004; Martin 2005) requires that the net be cast wide. 
Contemporary research cannot be limited to organised and collec-
tive forms of religion only. It is also necessary to consider the role of 
individual subjectivity and experience, the ‘invisible’ presence of religion 
(Luckmann 1967) in everyday life (McGuire 2008), in the luidity of cul-
tures, identities, and social movements, and in the dynamics of global 
transformations. Awareness of the weight of history in shaping religion 
is also essential if we are to appreciate the way it expresses itself today.
It is important to resist the temptation to try to understand faith through 
homogenising categories such as religious institutions (e.g. churches, 
mosques) and communities (e.g. the Muslim Brothers, the Evangelical 
movement) when attempting to gain a deeper understanding of how 
religion works and the many ways that it matters to people. Perhaps 
a fuller picture of religion in today’s world could be gained by observing 
how religion manifests itself concomitantly at all these levels – global, 
institutional, group and individual. 
An initial attempt to empirically distil the essence of religion in 
a comprehensive manner was made by American sociologists Glock 
and Stark (1965). They set out to identify, using a quantitative method, 
ive key features of what is commonly understood to be religiosity, 
namely the ritual and the ideological components, the experiential/
emotional side, intellectual engagement, and the consequential 
dimension or the effects of embracing a religion has on other aspects 
of a person’s life. While these features are supposedly related to each 
other, they do not necessarily appear in equal measure in each scenario. 
They are useful analytics because they succeed in condensing a series 
of relevant concepts drawn from a variety of perspectives on religion. 
This kind of analysis of religion is further complemented by the quali-
tative approaches taken by French sociologist Hérvieu-Léger (2000) 
and American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1993). Hérvieu-Léger 
concludes that despite its having become invisible and fragmented in 
the post-modern world, religion as an ‘expression of believing’ retains 
a strong connection with tradition; the constant efforts to revive and 
reconnect with the idea of tradition (even when it is completely re-
invented) and with the ‘memory’ of this continuity, are what makes 
8 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
religion vibrant and powerful in the present. Geertz is renowned for his 
deinition of religion as: 
‘(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) 
the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic’ (Geertz 1993, 90).
Yet, he also provides another deinition that is perhaps more pertinent 
in attempts to understand how and why religion matters to so many 
people today, and how it motivates some individuals so strongly to act, 
whether for good or for bad. For Geertz, religion ‘tunes human actions 
to an envisaged cosmic order and projects images of cosmic order onto 
the plane of human experience’ (Geertz 1993, 90). 
The desire to attain this ‘cosmic order’ is what engenders political 
theologies, that is, sets of ‘ideas that a religious body holds about 
legitimate political authority’ in the world (Philpott 2007a, 507). This 
global perspective of world order and political authority is what makes 
religion relevant to the study of international relations. Religion offers 
more compelling reasons than do Realpolitik and economic advantage 
for people to put their lives on the line, as it ‘provides a vision of reality 
that transcends temporal and terrestrial life and thus inspires people 
to make the ultimate sacriice’ (Johnston and Cox 2003, 14).
Some, such as Juergensmeyer (2003), contend that the very idea of 
and the vivid imaginary associated with engagement in a cosmic war 
fought to protect some absolute truth is one of the central drivers of 
faith-based terrorism. However, there are several ways to analyse and 
criticise political arrangements from the perspective of ‘God’s ways with 
the world’ (Scott and Cavanaugh 2007, 2), and different political theolo-
gies stemming from a single faith tradition have proven to generate 
both violence and peace. This means that we need to reconsider rigid 
assumptions about and categorisations of any religion as ‘bad’ (violent) 
and political, or ‘good’ (peaceful) and non-political.
2.2. Conflict
While there is not room in this report to elaborate on theories of conlict, 
a working deinition of conlict is nevertheless necessary in the interest 
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of clarity. For Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005, 13), conlict 
‘is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs 
that arise as new formations generated by social change come up 
against inherited constraints’. By asserting that conlict is ‘an intrinsic 
and inevitable aspect of social change’ and that ‘the way we deal with 
conlict is a matter of habit and choice’, they seem to imply that under-
standing conlict and conlict resolution requires bypassing approaches 
relying on rational choice that privilege state actors, and instead focus-
ing only on competing material interests and hard power. 
Thus this paper adopts the concept of conlict in its broadest possible 
sense, which includes both symmetric and asymmetric conlicts (i.e. 
involving similar and dissimilar parties) and also Galtung’s (1969, 1975) 
widely accepted view that violence occurs not only in a direct way (the 
act of harming or killing) but is also hidden in societal structures (socio-
economic or juridical systems) and culture (the ideas shaping people’s 
attitudes), and that behaviours, structures and attitudes have to be 
addressed simultaneously to achieve peace. 
Attitudes are, of course, intertwined with perceptions, which are identi-
ied by Juergensmeyer (2003) and many others (e.g. Wolff 2006) as one 
of the factors that can trigger religious and ethnic violence. Perceptions 
are key to the construction and perpetuation of identities and narratives, 
both of individuals and of communities. Thus it is not surprising that per-
ceptions of prejudice, victimhood, and discrimination are central in the 
dynamics of structural, physical and cultural violence, whether religion 
or ethnicity are involved or not. 
Given the luid and kaleidoscopic nature of conlict, it is dificult to disen-
tangle causes and effects and draw clear conclusions, so a holistic ap-
proach that takes contextual variables into account is required. Religion 
may well be one of these variables, whether as something that may 
contribute to provoking or to solving conlict. However, its role should 
not be taken for granted and is certainly not ixed. 
One of the foremost thinkers on peace is again Johan Galtung. 
His distinction between ‘positive peace’ (the absence of indirect and 
structural violence) and ‘negative’ peace (the absence of direct violence) 
is used widely today to analyse situations of peace and conlict (Galtung 
1964). Variations of his theory and subsequent developments of it have 
been presented by leading scholars such as Jean-Paul Lederach (1996) 
and John Burton (1988), among others. A vast body of literature exists 
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on the implications of favouring one set of terminology over another 
in relation to conlict resolution, peacebuilding and peacemaking. 
In the interest of conciseness, this paper uses these three terms 
interchangeably, but acknowledges that processes of ‘transformation’ 
are central to paths leading towards peace. This transformative and 
gradual dimension involves stages of negative and positive peace 
and is especially important when it comes to appreciating religion’s 
contribution to peace.
3. Methodology
Given the complexity of the subject matter in this report, and the 
number of philosophical questions that it raises, we have chosen to take 
a qualitative and interpretive approach. It is based on a critical review 
of existing literature from a variety of academic ields, including but not 
limited to politics and international relations, peace and conlict studies, 
theology, sociology, history, social psychology, security and terrorism 
studies. It also examines materials that faith-based NGOs have pro-
duced on conlict and peacebuilding, and builds on existing research 
focusing on religion that has been undertaken and funded by DFID to 
study the roles of civil society and equality in conlict and peacebuilding. 
In our analysis of all of these sources, we have devised a methodol-
ogy that aims to capture the diversity of approaches that have been 
deployed in the study of the relationship between religion and conlict/
peacemaking, and also in the practice of dealing with these issues 
(i.e. from the perspective of diplomats/policymakers and faith-based 
organisations). We consider this inclusive methodology necessary to 
ensure breadth, objectivity and nuance of interpretation in this report, 
and to ensure that no particular conceptual framework was imposed 
that might limit or skew the investigation of such a complex and 
multifaceted topic.
An exhaustive literature review is beyond the scope of this study, so for 
practical purposes we have organised the review into three sections. 
The irst provides a broad overview of the relationship between religion 
and conlict. The second examines sources that identify religion as 
a driver of conlict, while the third looks at sources that provide evidence 
of cases where religion acts as a driver of peace. In addition, in an effort 
to cover aspects of the subject that may not have been fully captured 
in our literature review, we present three case studies. These delve into 
the details and compare them in situations where religion is normally 
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considered to be a powerful force promoting violence or peace. The 
case studies allow the reader to appreciate the speciicities of different 
socio-economic and historical contexts. More importantly, they also al-
low readers to unravel the bundled concept of religion in these conlicts, 
identify some of its key features, and examine if and how they intersect 
with each other as well as with other factors shaping conlict and peace-
making. Speciically, we concentrated on:
a. the type of concepts (religious or not) that emerge in a conlict 
that is considered to be religious;
b. the actors (religious or not) involved and those that use 
these concepts;
c. the kind of arguments (religious or not) that are used by the 
identiied actors in deploying the concepts.
This division into these three sections is important as a means of 
capturing some key nuances of the issues under investigation, which in 
turn are helpful for elaborating appropriate and tailored policy responses. 
While many conlicts can be branded as ‘religious’, the religious factors 
at play are different in each situation. For example, by focusing one 
section on ‘religious concepts’ we can determine if and in what ways 
a religious claim is central to a war (e.g. Islamic State wants to establish 
and strengthen its Caliphate), or how a religious concept is borrowed by 
a non-religious cause (e.g. a nationalist ight where what is at stake is 
not ‘religious rule’ but control of territory and resources by a particular 
ethnic or national group, as in the case of the Yugoslav conlicts). 
At the level of ‘actors’ we can distinguish what kinds of people or 
groups are involved in a conlict that is considered ‘religious’, whether 
they are religious or secular leaders, individuals or communities, male or 
female. The assumption here is that there are situations where religious 
concepts/claims may not be central to a conlict and yet the conlict 
is considered to be ‘religious’ because prominent religious igures 
are involved. Similarly, there may be situations where non-religious 
personalities appropriate religious concepts to help them implement 
their plans. Finally, by focusing a third section on arguments we aim to 
consider the type of rationale used by religious or non-religious actors 
that may deploy either religious or non-religious concepts. By applying 
simultaneously the three levels of analysis, we are able to portray 
the degree to which religion is relevant to a particular situation, and 
thus to identify targeted policy responses. The hope is that such an 
exercise that breaks down a very complex situation by analysing these 
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factors could be of particular use for those civil servants and policy- and 
decision-makers that are grappling with the dilemmas of responding 
swiftly to crises with a religious dimension, whether at home or abroad.
The case studies provide snapshots of conlicts in three different 
regions of the world where the role that religion may have played is 
disputed. Using the analytical framework above, each case examines 
what aspects of religion, if any, have been factors in causing, 
maintaining, preventing or resolving conlictual situations and violence. 
The choice of case studies is selective, and not representative of all 
possible typologies of conlicts and all religions in the world. However, 
we have included cases that involve three different religious traditions 
(Christianity, Islam, Judaism) – albeit all from the same Abrahamic 
family – and three regions that are often viewed as hubs for ethnic 
conlicts: the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans (see Wolff 2006). 
We also focussed on covering a range of conigurations of conlict; 
the countries selected have distinct histories, socio-economic 
characteristics, institutional capacity, and are in different positions 
vis-à-vis Western powers and European history. They are also signiicant 
in that they offer examples of conlicts at different stages (ongoing 
in Israel-Palestine; oficially ended in Bosnia and in Mali, although 
tensions between communities persist) and involving both inter-faith 
tensions (Israel-Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and intra-faith ones 
(Mali, and to a certain extent also Palestine and Israel, if we consider 
the split between Muslims supporting Hamas and Muslims supporting 
Fatah, and the array of Jewish movements and parties holding 
disparate views). 
Finally, despite their speciic local origins, these conlicts all have an 
international dimension in common, namely international aid or the 
intervention of international troops, and also because they can have 
repercussions on faith communities abroad).
4. Literature review 
‘[C]onflict and violence often have a religious dimension, whether 
they occur between adherents of different faith traditions or rivals 
within a faith tradition. Religion may play a role as a marker of identity, 
a mobilizing device, a basis for rationalizing violent behaviour or 
a source of values on which to base peace-building and reconciliation. 
The relationships between religious and other key actors, especially in 
the state, are complex. Religious leaders may play important roles in 
instigating or preventing violence, and in either sustaining bad feeling 
or attempting to prevent a re-occurence. The various organizational 
forms associated with religious traditions may provide a basis for 
mobilization, give humanitarian assistance during the emergency, 
assist longer term recovery and build peaceful (or confrontational) 
relationships in the longer term’. (Best and Rakodi 2011, 5)
For a long time, mainstream publications on conlict and peace studies, 
as well as those on international relations, tended to ignore the subject 
of ‘religion’. However, proliic literature that addresses the relationship 
between religion, peace, conlict and diplomacy began to emerge during 
the 1990s. Much of it was contradictory, often written from a religious 
perspective by individuals with a religious background. But much of it 
was also inspired by universalist thinking, analysing the bridges built by 
religions across societies and throughout history, without neglecting the 
divisive power of religious discourse. Thus, this report devotes substan-
tial attention to this literature. In addition, our broad understanding of 
the notion of conlict has led us to incorporate in this study a section 
addressing the topic of what is generally called ‘religious terrorism’.
4.1. Religion as a driver of conflict
Religion is often seen as a key cause of conlict, both in individual 
societies and on the international scene. While the proponents of this 
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viewpoint are numerous, one scholarly igure ought to be remembered 
as the central point of reference for this argument. Samuel Huntington 
(1993; 1997), borrowing partly on an idea put forward by British-Ameri-
can historian, Bernard Lewis (1990), became the most prominent voice 
claiming that religious and cultural identities would be the main driver 
of international conlict in the new world order following the end of the 
Cold War. He argued that although the nation state would remain the 
most powerful actor in the international arena, the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
would become the new force fuelling conlict. His categorisation of the 
world into nine different civilisations is based mostly along religious 
lines. He contends that conlicts can occur both on a local level within 
a state with groups belonging to different civilisations, or among neigh-
bouring states (‘fault-line conlicts’); and also on a global level between 
and among states that belong to different civilisations (‘core-state con-
licts’). He argues that civilisations compete on the international scene, 
and that this competition can turn into violent conlict, most importantly 
because of the different religions that have formed these civilisations. 
Conlict lines on the international scene, he maintains, are primarily 
those between the Muslim and the non-Muslim world, which have 
shaped the history of conlict for centuries (Huntington 1993, 1997). 
As powerful and representative of the current status of international 
affairs as this may seem, such a primordialist view of religion does not 
promote convincing discussions that take into account aspects of Islam 
or Muslim societies that could determine conlicts and international 
affairs today. This kind of argument also fails to appreciate how Islam 
becomes intertwined with other factors, which might better explain 
conlict dynamics inside and between neighbouring countries and also 
within entire regions. Most importantly, the Lewis-Huntington argument 
can be criticised for being based on weak history and for underestimat-
ing or ignoring deep fault lines that have existed within and among 
denominations of the same religious family.
Besides examining religion as a driver of violent conlict, scholars have 
also been concerned with the extent to which religion may indirectly 
foster or tolerate violence. The nexus between faith and conlict is 
thus addressed by referring to religion as a cause of structural violence 
through discrimination and exclusions. This line of reasoning is sup-
ported by the fact that religious identities can erect potent boundaries 
and provoke ierce confrontation within a group when there is exces-
sive emphasis on claims by some that they belong and adhere to or 
are protecting a set of absolute truths. Anthropologists often examine 
16 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
how, within and across societies, religion is used to create differences 
among people. Political scientists argue that religion, through its 
inherent distinction between an in-group and an out-group, can lead to 
structural violence both within societies and on the international scene. 
Urging that we take into consideration the existence of various levels 
of violence, Galtung (1969) argues that religion is often the source of 
‘cultural violence’, a form of violence that is used to legitimise other 
forms of violence. Without seeking to establish a direct cause and effect 
between religion and violence, Galtung shows how different factors 
such as religion, ideology, language and ethnicity become intertwined 
to shape ways of thinking and behaviours that can lead to situations of 
exclusion, discrimination and eventually also physical violence. 
Another way of establishing an indirect relationship between religion 
and violence is by focusing on the inaction of religious groups. Boulding 
(1986), for example, argues that religions have not succeeded in using 
their potential for peacebuilding, and thus they have lent support to 
states when they are at war. While religion has not ignited a conlict, 
it has worked as ‘an obstacle to peace’. 
The majority of experts on religion and politics, nationalism, and conlict 
and peace, however, concur that conlicts are usually characterised 
by a set of motivations and their interactions, and thus an analysis of 
conlict factors cannot be limited to only one of these dimensions, be 
it religious, political, historical, or economic (see, for example, Berdal 
2003, 492; Laitin 2007; Mayall 1990; Toft 2007). 
The Iraqi-born British historian Elie Kedourie (1960) became famous 
for his controversial view of nationalism as a Western invention. He 
regarded nationalism as the greatest evil of the twentieth century, the 
export of which was particularly catastrophic in the Middle East. While 
likening nationalism to religion because of its despotic and divisive quali-
ties, Kedourie did not, however, attribute the emergence of nationalism 
to religion; indeed he regarded the two as being essentially opposed.
Scholars with expertise on the Indian subcontinent (among them: Talbot 
2007; Bhatt 2001; Mayall and Srinivasan 2009; Waseem 2010) argue for 
more nuanced readings of the apparent inter- and intra-state religious 
conlicts affecting India and Pakistan. This means examining central 
elements in the emergence of violent attacks on religious minorities 
and on sacred sites. Among those are the historical legacy (from both 
during and before the colonial era), attempts to elaborate modern 
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(secular) nationalist projects, weak state institutions, and blatant 
competition for political power among and within ethnic groups and 
competing religious and political leaders. It is against the background 
of these factors and in the changing context as societies feel the 
pressures of modernity, globalisation and multicultural society, that 
violence becomes morally and religiously sanctioned, argues Indian 
psychoanalyst Sundhir Kakar (1996). 
Taking into account economic factors, a global study coordinated by 
Oxford professor Frances Stewart (2008) reaches similar conclusions. 
It centres on the hypothesis that violent conlict in multicultural 
societies occurs in the presence of major horizontal inequalities among 
culturally deined groups. The argument is that when cultural differences 
coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this 
can cause deep resentment that may in turn lead to violent struggles. 
This builds on the work of Gurr (1993) and Collier et al. (2003), whose 
theories stress the centrality of mobilisation based on group identity and 
poverty and deprivation in conlict. It also conirms the inding by Fearon 
and Laitin (1996) that multicultural societies do not generate conlict just 
because they are multicultural. It is rather the combination of multiple 
factors that ignites conlicts. 
Wolff (2006) proposes comprehensive elaboration on these factors. 
He usefully distinguishes between ‘underlying’ (structural, political, 
economic, social, cultural, perceptual) and ‘proximate’ causes of conlict 
(i.e. the role of leaders and their strategic choices, both domestically 
and in neighbouring countries). Underlying causes are ‘necessary, but 
not suficient conditions for the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence’ (Wolff 
2006, 68). The ‘proximate’ causes, by contrast, enable or accelerate 
conlicts in situations ‘in which all or some of the underlying “ingredi-
ents” are present’ (Wolff 2006, 70–71). Accepting the existence of this 
multiplicity of factors leading to multiple conigurations thus explains 
‘why, despite similar basic conditions, not every situation of ethnic ten-
sions leads to full-scale civil war’ (Wolff 2006, 71). Ethnic conlicts, Wolff 
argues, are not necessarily always about ethnicity; rather, this is often 
‘a convenient common denominator to organize a conlict group in the 
struggle over resources, land, or power […] a convenient mechanism to 
organize and mobilize people into homogeneous conlict groups willing 
to ight each other for resources that are at best indirectly linked to 
their ethnic identity’ (Wolff 2006, 64–65). Ethnicity and religion are not 
synonyms but they frequently overlap. Thus it seems safe to conclude 
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that religion – as any other factor – can be part of the picture but cannot, 
alone, be a cause of conlict.
Fox (2003) has demonstrated that self-determination and nationalism 
are the primary causes of ethnic conlicts, while religious factors 
can inluence the dynamics of the conlict and increase its intensity. 
Furthermore, religion causes violence only when it is combined with 
these other factors (Fox 2004b). Fox (2001) speciically examines 
the role of religion in conlicts in the Middle East and their resulting 
characteristics, based on the Minorities at Risk dataset and religious 
factors, and he inds that religion plays a disproportionately important 
role in ethno-religious conlicts in the region, more so than in non-
Middle Eastern states with Muslim majorities. States in the Middle 
East are also disproportionately more autocratic than in other regions. 
However, despite the unique importance of religion, Fox argues that 
the prevalence of religious conlict is not explained by either the Islamic 
or autocratic character of the states, and in reality the ethno-religious 
conlicts in the Middle East are not signiicantly different from similar 
ethnic struggles around the world. This, he concludes, contradicts 
Huntington’s (1993) notion of Islam’s ‘bloody borders’, as the conlicts 
in the Middle East are not more violent than other ethnic conlicts. He 
warns, however, that actions based on Huntington’s notion could lead to 
a self-fulilling prophecy. In a further study also based on the Minorities 
at Risk dataset, Fox (2004) does argue that religious conlict is more 
contagious than non-religious conlict; however, only violent conlicts 
cross borders while non-violent ones do not.
The nature of grievances and demands in a conlict is central to the 
analyses of Svensson (2007) and Fox (2003). Fox argues that ‘when 
religious issues are important, they will change the dynamics of 
the conlict’, (2003, 125). This can be attributed both to the role of 
religious institutions within the state and to the way in which religion 
inluences international intervention in ethnic conlict. Internally, 
religious institutions tend to facilitate a reaction if the grievances have 
religious importance; however, if they have no religious importance the 
religious institutions often inhibit protest. With regards to international 
intervention, Fox maintains that other states are more likely to intervene 
if they have religious minorities in common and if the conlict is ethno-
religious. Using data from international interventions, he shows that 
Islamic states are most likely to intervene and that Islamic minorities 
are  most likely to beneit from that intervention. 
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Svensson (2007) argues that across religions, where the grievances or 
demands are based on explicit religious claims, the negotiated settle-
ment of conlict is less likely to succeed than if there are no religious 
claims. He demonstrates that the chances for negotiated settlement 
are not affected if the conlicting parties are from different religious 
traditions. Svensson’s argument is based on data from intra-state 
armed conlicts between 1989 and 2003, using the Uppsala Conlict 
Data Programme. He concludes that efforts should be made to prevent 
conlicting parties from developing their demands in religious terms, 
given that negotiated settlements are more likely if religious claims are 
not involved. 
Galtung’s (2014) theory of the peace potential of religions essentially 
focuses on the factors that can make religions prone to promoting 
violence and then extrapolates from these to identify and develop the 
factors that lend to the potential of religions to maintain or build peace, 
arguing that the latter can and should be promoted. Although he notes 
that different religions have different degrees of potential to promote 
peace, he clearly acknowledges that there is no automatic connection 
between the belief system of a speciic religion and the use of force 
by its followers. He also rejects the notion of ‘religious conlicts’, as 
conlicts are multi-dimensional and complex and cannot usually be 
reduced to only one causal factor (Galtung 2014, 32). To understand the 
peace potential of religions, he looks to what extent religions are prone 
to promote or reject direct violence and structural violence.
With regard to direct violence, Galtung (2014) argues that the idea of 
‘being a Chosen People’ and the value of ‘aggressive missionarism’ 
built into the core belief system of a religion can lead to direct violence 
perpetrated by its followers. ‘Holy War’ and ‘Just War’ become terms 
used to justify the use of violence against other people. 
He notes that all religions advocate a special relationship with their 
god(s) and fellow believers, thus creating in-groups and out-groups. 
However, different religions also have different potential to promote 
other forms of structural violence, such as economic exploitation and 
political repression. Galtung cites the example of slavery, which was 
legitimised in religious terms by some Christians. 
Based on this theory, Galtung develops a generalised model of major 
religions in the world and classiies them according to their inherent 
potential to reject both direct and structural violence. Most importantly, 
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he argues that, in general, Hinduism rejects both forms of violence and 
thus has a large potential for peace. However, Hinduism is less than 
explicit about rejecting direct (physical) violence, and it also tolerates 
and promotes structural (cultural) violence through its caste system. 
Islam rejects a societal caste system (structural violence), but is prone 
to promote direct violence through its doctrine obliging all its followers 
to defend the faith. Other religions, in particular Christianity, are predis-
posed to promote both structural and direct violence. Galtung clearly 
accepts that this theory is a general one, and that there are many pos-
sibilities to cite counter-examples. However, he uses his theory mainly 
to justify the need for more dialogue, both intra-religious and inter-faith, 
which can promote the peace potential of religions (Galtung 1997). 
In the light of the research evidence presented so far, it is clear why 
many – if not all – scholars of religion and politics subscribe to the 
expression ‘ambivalence of the sacred’; religion itself is also neither 
good nor bad, but its power can be used to accelerate violence (bad) or 
promote peace (good) across societies (Appleby 2000; Haynes 2011; 
Philpott 2007a). Trying to distinguish between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ 
violence is not only useless but also dangerous (Cavanaugh 2009) 
since, ‘privileging religious explanations also serves to depoliticise 
and securitise in the political realm’ (Jackson and Gunning 2011, 382). 
The consensus seems to be that while religion should not be taken 
for granted as the main driving force of violence and conlict, it cannot 
be excluded from accounts of international relations, impacting both 
interstate relations and domestic politics (see among others Fox 2004a; 
Thomas 2005). 
4.2. Islam and faith-based terrorism
In his response to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ article (1993), 
Edward Said (2001) argued that not only political leaders, but even 
academics can fall into the trap of simpliication by basing their argu-
ments on a perception of static, rather than dynamic relations between 
social and religious groups. He points out that the use of labels for 
groups, rather than groups themselves, are driving factors of conlict. 
For him, the political and academic discourse on religious identities that 
distinguishes between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ promotes and ampliies 
conlict (Said 2001). Cavanaugh (2009) echoes this by arguing that the 
prevalent discourse of the violent force of religion is a myth that has 
been constructed by Western societies to legitimise their existence; 
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and this myth is used to justify violence perpetrated by the West against 
Islamic societies. 
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Islam has been centre 
stage when it comes to research on the links between religion and 
conlict. Popular commentaries facilely point to the ideological sources 
of conlict, maintaining that the Qur’an is inherently violent and that all 
forms of Islamism are nothing but an antecedent of violence, terrorism 
and totalitarianism. Indeed, a dataset of suicide attacks from 1981 to 
March 2008 shows not only an escalation of these from 2000 onwards, 
but also that ‘most contemporary suicide attacks can be attributed to 
jihadist groups’ (Moghadam 2009), while until recently the evidence 
(from a study taking into account data up to 2003) was that secular and 
religious groups had been responsible for a roughly equal number of sui-
cide actions (Pape 2003). Several scholars, including Moghadam (2009) 
and Khosrokhavar (2005) have shown how key the religious ideology of 
martyrdom is to explaining this sudden rise of Islam-motivated suicide 
missions. Yet other experts on Islam and terrorism play down – without 
ignoring – the ideological component. In their view, the escalation of 
violence carried out in the name of Islam must be attributed to a combi-
nation of factors where contextual variables, individual psychologies and 
opportunity structures in a society are central (Hafez 2003; Jackson and 
Gunning 2011; Mandaville 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005a). Looking at entire 
processes rather than examining individual factors, ideas or actors 
appears to be more productive in capturing the shifting role of religion, 
and of Islam more speciically, in the current challenges of conlict and 
terrorism that the international community faces.
On the theme of radicalisation, biographical studies of convicted 
terrorists have been carried out and there is no conclusive evidence 
demonstrating if or how religion plays a role or showing what the typical 
proile of the would-be radical, and his or her path to radicalisation, 
is. Rather, the literature urges us to see these dynamics against the 
backdrop of societal and global transformations and their challenges 
to individual identities (see Roy 2004; Wiktorowicz 2005a; Coolsaet 
2011; Schmid 2013). For instance, after researching the trial evidence 
of the irst convicted Islamist terrorist in Australia, Aly and Striegher 
(2012, 850) come to the conclusion that ‘religion plays a far lesser role 
in radicalization toward violent extremism than the [counterterrorism] 
policy response contends’. 
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Certainly, Islamic State and other jihadist groups legitimise themselves 
through a repertoire of ‘ideas that have broad resonance among 
Muslim-majority populations’ (Hamid 2014). But the fact that radical 
jihadi groups resort to Islamic sources to justify their violent acts cannot, 
on its own, prove that Islam is inherently violent. Rather, as Wiktoro-
wicz (2005b, 94) argues, it demonstrates their tactical ability to frame 
violence in Islamic terms, which is possible thanks to a gradual ‘erosion 
of critical constraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical 
Islam’. Many, therefore, have urged moderate Muslims to pre-empt this 
manipulation of Islamic knowledge. Yet, Moghadam (2009, 78) warns, 
we have to recognise that the factors involved in this type of terrorism 
are multiple and diverse and that ‘the battle against suicide attacks will 
not be won by exposing the inconsistencies of Salai jihad alone’. 
Following Gellner (see section 2.1.) we could argue that the central 
problem is not the religious truth itself, but the exclusivist mindset of 
those appropriating and disseminating it. Similarly, for Berman (2007), 
the origin of conlict lies not in religion, but rather in extremist thinking, 
be it radical Islam/Islamism (which he calls ‘Muslim totalitarianism’), 
Christian religious fundamentalism, fascism, secular dictatorships, or 
extreme authoritarianism. During the twentieth century, violent conlict 
on the international scene was caused by such extremist thinking, rather 
than by religion per se. It is also important to remember that adherence 
to strict religious practices or conservative views is no guarantee 
that fundamentalism has been embraced (Brekke 2012). And while 
it has often been the case that violent actions have stemmed from 
fundamentalist beliefs, no automatic mechanism has been identiied 
whereby fundamentalism entails violence (Almond et al.2002). 
Terrorism studies experts often seem to look at religion through 
a narrow lens that focuses only on ideology. Rapoport (2002) was 
central in popularising the term ‘religious’ (or faith-based) terrorism 
with his theory of the ‘waves’ of terrorism, while others categorised 
it as ‘new’ (Laqueur 1999; Neumann 2009). Juergensmeyer (2003) 
warns against the cosmologies of violence emanating from religion, 
and Hoffman (2006) too stresses the powerful role of religious 
narratives and the position of religious leaders in legitimising acts of 
violence. However these scholars are also careful not to demonise 
religion per se, and they all acknowledge too that other factors need 
to be taken into consideration. For instance, according to Rapoport 
(2002), the latest – current – wave of religious terrorism includes 
features of previous waves of terrorism (i.e. anarchy, self-determination, 
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socialism). Even someone like Juergensmeyer (2003), who believes 
that religion has provided the motivation, world view and organisation 
for either conducting or supporting acts of terrorism, acknowledges 
that other contextual variables also need to be addressed in each case 
being examined. 
Based on a quantitative comparison of Islam-related terrorist attacks 
between 1968 and 2005, Piazza (2009, 63) accepts that ‘religiously-
motivated terrorist groups are indeed more prone than are secular 
groups to committing attacks that result in greater casualties’. He shows 
that in that period ‘Islamist groups were responsible for 93.6 per cent of 
all terrorist attacks by religiously-oriented groups and were responsible 
for 86.9 per cent of all casualties inlicted by religiously-oriented terrorist 
groups’ (Piazza 2009, 64). However he demystiies the assumption that 
Islamist terrorism is more ‘lethal’ than other types of terrorism, by point-
ing out the constellations of ideologies that fall under the nebulous term 
‘Islamism’ and that besides religious ideologies and practice, one should 
also focus on groups’ ‘organisational features’ and ‘goal structures’. On 
the basis of this type of analysis, he argues, only Al Qaeda and similarly 
structured groups are likely to be seriously dangerous.
Many have also asked whether economic factors have a role to play 
when people engage in terrorism and in faith-based political violence. 
Research by Krueger (2007) as well as by Piazza (2006) and by Canetti 
et al. (2010) has found no evidence that poverty or loss of economic 
resources are predictors of engagement in terrorism. However, Canetti 
et al. (2010) did ind that distress and loss of ‘psychological’ (rather than 
economic) resources do have a correlation with religion in the context 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conlict. Piazza, on the other hand, argues that 
state repression and party politics are important predictors of terrorism 
(2006) and that countries with minority groups experiencing economic 
discrimination have a signiicant likelihood of being exposed to domestic 
terrorist attacks (2011). 
Another line of interpretation puts aside religious values and beliefs 
to focus instead on particular individuals in privileged/elite positions 
within particular religious traditions and communities. Once again, 
the argument is not that religion itself leads to violence, but that it is 
manipulated by opportunistic and power-thirsty (faith or political) leaders 
who appropriate religious language for their own ends. Toft (2007, 103) 
has named this phenomenon ‘religious outbidding’; that is, ‘elites 
attempt to outbid each other to enhance their religious credentials 
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and thereby gain the support they need to counter an immediate 
threat’. Typically religious language is used to cultivate the identity of 
those mobilised and to reinforce out-group markers of the ‘other’. This 
process, Stewart (2009) notes, does not happen all at once, but takes 
place over a long period of time. Apart from using religion for grand 
causes, it is often the case that leaders resort to it to promote their own 
underlying interests and so again it is not religion per se that contributes 
to conlict but rather the way it is used within societies. 
Following this line of analysis, Toft shows that compared with either 
Christianity or Hinduism, Islam was greatly over-represented in civil 
wars in the twentieth century. She argues that political leaders in the 
Islamic world used religion to lend themselves greater legitimacy, 
and thus increase their capacity to mobilise the population and 
strengthen their power base (Toft 2007). De Juan (2015) arrives at 
a similar conclusion in his study of religious elites in intrastate conlict 
escalation. Besides providing ‘quotidian norm setting’, religious 
leaders ‘communicate speciic narratives and shape the religious 
self-conception of the believers’ and are also crucial in the ‘constitution 
of radical religious conlict interpretations’ (De Juan 2015, 764). His work 
examines ‘the motives of religious elites to call for violence’ rather than 
‘the structural prerequisites of their success’. Using case studies from 
Thailand, Iraq and the Philippines, he shows that ‘competing religious 
elites try to mobilize their followers against their rivals to establish 
their predominance within their religious community’ (De Juan 2015, 
765). He also notes that in this competition ‘for material and dogmatic 
supremacy’, these religious elites become inclined to promote violence, 
establish alliances with political elites and thus become triggers of 
intra-religious and intrastate conlicts (De Juan 2015, 762). Yet, the 
scholar insists, religion is not itself the cause of the conlict.
In his acclaimed book, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Appleby (2000) 
goes beyond arguing the obvious, i.e. that religious texts can provide 
justiications for either promoting peace or war, pointing out that both 
violent extremism and non-violent movements can be religious. Instead, 
his interest is in the factors that cause religion to be used to legitimise 
violence. For him, it is ‘religious illiteracy’, a lack of understanding of 
religious writings and their interpretations by the common people, 
which makes it possible for reckless political and religious leaders to 
manipulate populations to achieve their violent objectives. At the same 
time, Appleby sees the inherent ambivalence of religion as fundamen-
tally positive because it provides opportunities for peace promotion. 
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4.3. Religion and state failure/collapse
There appears to be a strong correlation between the emergence of 
religious conlict and situations of state failure or collapse. Fox (2007), 
for instance, tracks state failures between 1960 and 2004, identifying 
the shifts in the role of religion and state failure. Using data from the 
State Failure dataset, he identiies an increase in state failure related 
to religion as a proportion of all state failures during this period, and 
inds that it became the most common kind of state failure in 2002, 
after which he identiies religion as an element in the majority of all 
conlicts that relate directly to state failure. 
Since 11 September 2001, state failure and state collapse have been 
associated with terrorism and labelled as the ‘Orthodox Failed States 
Narrative’, which developed based on the experience of the rise of the 
Taliban in the collapsed state of Afghanistan (Verhoeven 2009). Several 
studies argue that there was an increase in Islamic extremism in the 
state failures experienced in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia in the 2000s. 
However, they also differ in how much the various authors emphasise 
the role of religion as a cause of increased extremism and offer different 
explanations for the phenomenon.
Mwangi (2012), for example, identiies the combination of state collapse 
and Islamism in Somalia as accounting for the legitimacy gained by 
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin (Al-Shabaab), a non-state armed 
extremist group that provided local governance in Somalia, conirming 
the fears that arise from the Orthodox Failed State Narrative. He 
portrays Islamism not as a theological construct but as a political 
ideology that helps provide answers to the contemporary social and 
political challenges facing the Muslim world. Mwangi argues that radical 
Islam is most powerful as a mobilising tool when Muslim populations 
feel threatened by secular or Christian states. Following Hoehne (2009), 
he links the rise and radicalisation of Al-Shabaab with the joint American-
Ethiopian anti-terror strategy, as well as the dificulties the Somali 
people faced under conditions of state collapse, which left the country 
with no central authority. Devlin-Foltz and Ozkececi-Taner (2010, 89) 
also consider the case of Somalia and while they too found a correlation 
between ‘state collapse and an increase in Islamists’ appeal and 
inluence’, they go on to argue that, ‘state collapse does not necessarily 
generate more violent ideologies … rather [it] allows those committed 
to violence under all circumstances to allay more moderate elements’. 
They conclude that political opportunities make violence a ‘normal and 
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effective’ means of political competition (2010, 105), and when secular 
groups employ violence, moderate Islamist groups may move to view 
violence as necessary and align themselves with a wider range of 
Islamists, which can increase the inluence of more extreme factions. 
However, Islamist groups in both Somalia and Iraq had also to recognise 
the non-ideological interests of the population to gain legitimacy in 
those countries. 
Other scholars are even more dismissive of the Islamist terrorism threat 
in Somalia. For Bryden (2003, 25), an analyst with the International Crisis 
Group, the most persuasive feature that attracts followers to Al-Itixaad, 
the group supposed to be Al Qaeda’s main branch in the country, ‘is its 
inancial clout: few Somalis are attracted by the movement’s theologi-
cal pedantry or its proclivity to violence’. Moreover, Islamists are the 
last addition to a ‘witches’ brew of ethnic, religious, and geopolitical 
tensions’ in Somalia and thus have to compete with domestic, regional 
and foreign forces in a ‘crowded political arena’ (Bryden 2003, 26). Thus, 
he concludes, ‘Somalia poses a more concrete and immediate threat to 
international security as a cockpit for regional interests than as a link in 
the chain of transnational terrorism’ (Bryden 2003, 26). In fact, as Shinn 
(2003, 80) commented, the ‘underlying conditions’ of East Africa and 
the Horn ‘contribute directly to conlict and the use of terrorist tactics’; 
the region has porous borders and readily available weapons, and 
poverty and social injustice are widespread.
In the long history of tribal confrontations affecting the Sudan (and 
South Sudan), religion is often said to play a central role. However, 
Islamic identity has proved not to be a ixed or constant marker of 
Sudanese communal tensions. Instead, it has been tactically played 
(i.e. taken up and also in turn abandoned) under particular circumstanc-
es by different groups and individuals (Jok 2007). Identities, we know, 
are never static and are always socially constructed, but this appears 
to be especially true for Sudan, where the notions of racial, ethnic and 
religious identity are particularly luid (Jok 2007). 
Cramer and Goodhand (2002) are also interested in how those vying 
for authority seek to gain legitimacy in failed or collapsed states. They 
identify three methods that historically have been used for gaining 
legitimacy in Afghanistan, namely tribalism, Islam and nationalism. They 
explain that many Afghans perceive the nation as a religious community 
and therefore during times of crisis, the notion of jihad has been used 
to mobilise the population. They track the historical use of Islam in 
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the development of the state and argue that the emergence of the 
Taliban was part of a process of different forms of Islamic inluence in 
Afghanistan’s history. Radicalisation of Islamic groups in the 2000s was 
a means of gaining legitimacy in response to the crisis of political Islam 
(Roy cited in Cramer & Goodhand 2002, 903).
Verhoevan (2009, 419) presents another dimension of the rise of Islamic 
extremism in failed states, arguing that in the case of Somalia, external 
factors had the greatest impact. He argues that US-led fears of an 
‘Al Qaeda safe-haven’ forming in Somalia led to ‘a self-fulilling prophe-
cy’. He argues that America’s fear that the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) 
were Somalia’s ‘neo-Taliban’, caused them to create conditions, through 
the American-Ethiopian axis, which pushed the moderate nationalist 
militants who were actually succeeding in creating order and stability, 
towards the radical, ‘real (inter)national jihadis’. (2009, 407). Verhoeven 
then concludes that the international community must move away from 
the terrorism/failed state nexus and conceptualise ‘state collapse as 
a series of painful but essential processes of “creative destruction”’.
Hossein-Zadeh (2005, 2) also deems external factors important in the 
link between failed states and terrorism, arguing that it was Western 
imperialism and Western policies in the Middle East region that caused 
the Muslim world to turn to conservative religious leaders ‘as a source 
of deiance’, against the Western powers, rather than the nature of Islam 
or the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory. He assesses Western intervention 
efforts and development programmes in the Middle East, arguing that 
at times when these programmes met the hopes and aspirations of the 
people, an Islamic alternative was not embraced. However, when the 
people were demoralised and disappointed, an Islamic revival was nur-
tured instead. The study therefore disputes the proposition that Islam is 
inherently confrontational and claims that socioeconomic and geopoliti-
cal policies account for the reactions of the Muslim people. His conclu-
sion, however, that Islam is not more violent than other religions does 
not follow from his study, but the historical account of the factors that 
inluenced the Islamic revival is useful in highlighting the peripheral role 
of religion.
While all of this evidence shows the presence of religious factors or ac-
tors in failed, weak or collapsing states, there seems to be a consensus 
among experts that the relationship between religion, state failure and 
violence is not unidirectional. Indeed, for many, the structural absence 
or malfunctioning of institutions, the prevailing cultures of fear, as well 
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as regional dynamics of instability, pave the way for extremist religious 
ideologies and ethnic rivalries to take over, rather than the other way 
round (see among others Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wolff 2006, 2011).
4.4. Religion as a driver of peace
Academic and policy-oriented literature on religion and international 
affairs is rich in publications arguing that religion is a useful – if not 
necessary – instrument for achieving peace. More speciically, religious 
beliefs/values, religious leaders and faith-based organisations are 
thought to have huge potential in promoting peace in any society and/
or in the international arena. Scholars in the US (Johnston and Sampson 
1994; Johnston 2003; Appleby 2001; Gopin 2000; Smock 2002; Shah et 
al. 2012; Coward and Smith 2004; Little 2007) seem to be leading this 
school of thought. In fact, ‘faith-based’ diplomacy was invented in the 
US (see for example the journal The Brandywine Review of Faith & In-
ternational Affairs). The US Institute of Peace has developed substantial 
resources for interfaith projects and publications, and the US govern-
ment recently created an ofice for ‘religious engagement’ in the State 
Department (Johnston and Cox 2003; Mandaville and Silvestri 2015). 
However, some important works in this vein are emerging in Europe 
too (e.g. Thomas 2005; Galtung and MacQueen 2008). In addition to the 
academic literature, numerous faith groups and NGOs are also mobilis-
ing and producing policy reports to promote and enhance the contribu-
tion by religious actors to development and reconciliation.
The camp of those arguing that the religious dimension needs to be in-
cluded in conlict resolution work is vast, but different authors highlight 
different reasons, aspects and priorities for this. Hence we have divided 
the following sections according to themes. 
Religious beliefs and values
In The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Appleby (2000) emphasises that 
ethics and ethical convictions, as expressed through religious beliefs, 
are main drivers for peace. Regardless of which religion may be preva-
lent, the ethical power of religion can help to unite divided societies. 
For Thomas (2005) too, religion has a role to play, especially as it can 
facilitate a dialogue about ‘virtues’ for shaping a better society. However, 
while acknowledging this and the useful characteristics of faith-based 
networks and NGOs, he warns against a reductionist approach, in which 
an instrumentalist perspective of religion and a logic of problem-solving 
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prevail while the need to address other issues and involve other actors 
is downplayed or discounted.
References to the Christian contribution to non-violence and 
peacebuilding are abundant. The key concepts are reconciliation, 
which is based on God’s own reconciliation with a sinful humanity, 
the powerful model of Jesus’ self-sacriice to redeem humanity, and 
his invitation to ‘turn the other cheek’, and inally his attention to the 
poor and the marginalised that encourages Christians to care about 
the dignity of the human person. In Christianity, there is a close 
relationship between social justice and reconciliation; one cannot 
happen without the other. This helps to explain the important work 
of Christian denominations in mediation and in promoting transitional 
justice (see Philpott 2007b). Christian values are also at the heart of the 
Western conception of human rights, even though a parallel, at times 
competitive, secular account exists. In the aftermath of World War II, 
the work of Christian denominations and the ecumenical movement 
were important pillars for the peaceful reconstruction of Europe and in 
the establishment of the European Communities (see Thomas 2005; 
Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006; Leustean 2014), even though the project 
of European integration later took a highly secular and liberal character, 
focused mainly on economic and political reasoning.
The majority of case studies in textbooks on religion and politics refer to 
mediation work or interfaith activities promoted by Christian denomina-
tions, such as those done in South Africa with Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, in Mozambique with Sant’Egidio, in the US with Martin Luther 
King, and also the courageous work in Nigeria, the Middle East and the 
Balkans of various priests (see Thomas 2005; Little 2007; Smock 2002; 
Lederach 1996, 1997). Buttry (1994) elaborates on the Christian heritage 
of non-violence and peacebuilding. He argues that Christian teaching and 
values provide the foundations for ‘Christian peacemaking’, i.e. Christian-
ity provides a whole set of non-violent responses to conlicts worldwide, 
both within and between societies (for a similar argument see also 
Friesen 1986). The work of Sampson and Lederach (2000) is often re-
garded as landmark research in demonstrating the pioneer role played by 
Mennonite communities in the history of their non-violent contributions 
to peacemaking. In addition, Quakers and Jehovah’s Witnesses, two 
groups that are part of the Christian family, have also made explicit their 
paciist stance and rejection of violence (MacCulloch 2010).
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Biggar (2013), on the other hand, provides a thought-provoking and 
profound analysis of Christian justiications for the morality and even 
the necessity of war, based on a thorough review of the long tradition 
of the just war theory in Christian thinking, combined with modern 
insights into international relations and the realities of war. By doing so, 
he aligns himself with the great Christian philosophers behind the just 
war theory, and adapts it to the modern world. He argues that war can 
sometimes be a necessity and that therefore, the Christian just war 
theory ultimately helps to end conlict and promote peace.
Muslim scholar Abu-Nimer (2003) argued that Islam is based on funda-
mental human values encoded in the Qur’an, related religious writings 
and the Islamic tradition. Based on those values, Muslim societies have 
developed a considerable set of non-violent tools for conlict resolution 
and peacebuilding experiences. Traditional Arab-Muslim mechanisms 
for dispute resolution include third-party mediation and arbitration 
in any form of social conlict. Such mechanisms also included tradi-
tional reconciliation methods, based on the value of forgiveness and 
public repentance.
Abu-Nimer (2003) also looks at how Islam developed a theory of de 
facto just war principles, both referring to jus ad bellum and jus in bello: 
‘War is permissible in self-defense, and under well-deined limits. When 
undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour (but not relentlessly), but 
only to restore peace and freedom of worship of Allah. In any case, 
strict limits must not be transgressed: women, children, old and inirm 
men should not be molested, nor trees and crops cut down, nor peace 
withheld when the enemy comes to terms’. At the same time, Islam 
has a tradition of non-violent resistance, also cited by Abu-Nimer (2003), 
which is exempliied by peaceful protests against British colonial rule in 
Egypt in 1919, the 1948 Iraqi uprising, the Iran Revolution in 1978–79, 
and the Sudanese insurrection of 1985. 
Social justice is a fundamental concept in Islam. It has been a central 
tenet of the Muslim Brotherhood’s mobilisation, and even Al Qaeda 
has tactically justiied its attacks by elaborating on this Islamic concept, 
combining it with apparent Third Worldist claims. Abu-Nimer (2003) 
shows how social justice and other Islamic values can help promote 
peaceful conlict resolution: ‘According to Islam, a nation cannot survive 
without making fair and adequate arrangements for the sustenance 
and welfare of all the poor, underprivileged, and destitute members of 
every community. The ultimate goal would be the elimination of their 
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suffering and poverty’. It can thus be argued that Islam is well suited 
to ighting against structural violence. Islamic values, he explains, are 
based on universal dignity of humanity, the equality of all races, ethnic 
groups, and the sacredness of human life and forgiveness are values 
that underpin any form of positive conlict resolution and help to build 
peaceful societies (Abu-Nimer 2003). 
On a similar note, Sachedina (2000, 20) highlighted the ‘centrality of 
Koranic teachings about religious and cultural pluralism as a divinely 
ordained principle of peaceful coexistence among human societies’. 
His work is a classic detailing of the human, non-violent values in Islam. 
Said et al. (2001) presented a valuable collection of essays exploring 
both Islamic teachings and practice on peaceful conlict resolution. 
They argued that Islam promotes, in theory and in practice, the values 
of justice, harmony and absence of war. Said et al also made a case 
for Islamic approaches to peacebuilding (Said et al 2002), and Kalin 
(2005) examined the concept of peace in the Islamic tradition to 
provide a contrast to the focus in the literature on the legal aspects of 
declaring jihad. He identiied four contexts: the metaphysical-spiritual in 
which ‘salam’, as one of the names of God, is assigned a substantive 
value; the philosophical-theological context in which the question of 
evil is addressed; the political-legal context, which is the locus of the 
legal discussions of war; and the socio-cultural context, which looks 
at the Muslim experiences of diversity with other faiths. Kalin (2005) 
concludes that Muslim communities must start addressing a ‘proper 
ethics of peace’ to assist in resolving of ethnic or sectarian conlicts 
in Muslim societies. 
Galtung and MacQueen (2008) analyse in detail the contribution 
to peacemaking by Asian religions such as Buddhism or Taoism, 
with reference to Galtung’s general theory of mentioned above. 
By presenting the ideas of 18 eminent Buddhist leaders, Chappell 
(1999) enlarged the understanding of Buddhist peacemaking traditions. 
Starting from and underlining the central role of achieving inner peace, 
he emphasises that Buddhism has a strong track record of providing 
peaceful answers to social and political violence, in particular through 
its worldwide grassroots work, and points to the responsibility 
that Buddhists have for promoting peace. However, others critique 
Buddhism for being too much of an individualistic tradition that does 
not really stress the importance of being at peace with the others, and 
note that it has missed opportunities to achieve peaceful solutions, 
in Sri Lanka and Tibet for example (Neumaier 2004). 
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According to Berling (2004), Confucianism has the potential to work for 
the common good, thanks to its notion of harmony and its stress on 
moral values and rituals. The works of Johnston (2003) and Little (2007) 
also contain case studies on Asia as well as other regions.
In their collection of essays, Polner and Goodman (1994) provide 
a irst-hand account of the traditions of non-violent conlict resolution 
in Judaism. Similarly, Steinberg (2000) argued that there are speciic 
Jewish approaches to conlict prevention and mediation, a theme also 
developed comprehensively by Marc Gopin, a prominent author and 
practitioner in the ield of conlict resolution, who specialises on the 
Middle East. Gopin’s (2000) central argument is that while the world’s 
major religions, in this case the three monotheistic ones, have histori-
cally and until today contributed signiicantly to violence, they can also 
be a key source of peace and conlict resolution, and their commit-
ment towards peace can be identiied in both classical theology and in 
modern interpretations. He notes, for example, that in Judaism there 
is the biblical concept of God ighting battles for the Children of Israel 
and Rabbinic analyses of milhemet hova (obligatory war) and milhemet 
mitzvah (war as fulilment of a positive deed before God), but alongside 
those are the Rabbinic belief in ‘shalom’ (peace) and ‘pikuach nefesh’ 
(preservation of life). In Islam, the Qur’an identiies jihad (holy war), but 
later interpretations split this into state jihad and religious jihad. There 
are also both peaceful and violent interpretations of the Mahdi tradition 
of a prophesied redeemer in Islam. Gopin highlights the complexities 
within all these religions in the way they conceive war, violence, peace 
and nonviolence. 
Gopin (2000) bases his critique of Western diplomacy on its ignorance 
of religious values and practices. He argues that religion and religious 
values need to be merged with traditional Western conlict resolution 
policies and practices, and that religious values, such as empathy, 
nonviolence and sanctity of human life, should be used to frame the 
language of conlict resolution. To achieve this, there is a need for a com-
prehensive understanding of religious values, institutions and practices, 
particularly the ways in which they have traditionally and historically 
approached issues of war and peace and the complex, variability of 
interpretations within each of the religions. Gopin cautions that the use 
of religious values and strategies of conlict resolution will be heavily 
dependent on context, potentially different each time enemies interact. 
He emphasises, therefore, the need to work with those involved in the 
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conlict rather than imposing a particular, albeit religiously educated, 
view from above (Gopin 2000).
Gopin’s work examines the issue of how religions approach ‘Others’ 
outside their faith, and both the dificulties and opportunities this 
presents for conlict resolution. For him, the concept of universal values 
and homogeneity are not part of the religious traditions, which draw 
important distinctions between believers and non-believers. He argues 
that this is not a negative or necessarily conlictual aspect of religion, 
but a natural part of human identity. Gopin maintains, however, that 
what is signiicant is how the boundaries are negotiated and the extent 
to which ‘prosocial interpersonal values of religious tradition exists’, 
as opposed to antisocial values (2000, 80). He also notes that in all 
religions there is rarely a call to kill on a massive scale, although the 
existence of proselytisers, those who have a theological issue with 
the Other, is a problem for his argument that religions promote conlict 
resolution. He suggests that there is a need to ind a balanced world 
view that does not necessitate the destruction of the Other, and also 
a need for signiicantly more consideration and recommendations on 
how such religious groups can be approached.
In his conclusion, Gopin provides a broad list of recommendations 
for religious igures and for policymakers, both globally and regionally. 
Particularly salient for policymakers are his suggestions that there 
is a need: to support religious leaders and those with important 
standing to move towards peace in the face of criticisms of heresy; for 
policymakers to understand the fears of religious groups, both actual 
and remembered ones, and develop policies that confront them; to 
become familiar with the potential effects of polices on the religious 
lives of communities; and, to allow religious constructs as well as 
religious groups needing to be part of the process of conlict resolution 
to guide policies, without giving them overwhelming power. 
As Fox (2000b) noted, despite his insightful contributions, Gopin (2000) 
unfortunately centres his study on the monotheistic religions, thus 
overlooking the potential contributions of other religions. Furthermore, 
much of Gopin’s book is focused on the internal conlict between 
religious and secular Jews in Israel and on the ways to overcome 
this, rather than on interreligious conlict. Gopin did suggest applying 
to interreligious conlict the ‘Mahoket’ concept, a traditional form of 
conlict resolution within Judaism, in which there is mutual respect 
between conlicting parties who ‘agree-to-disagree’. Yet this does not 
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seem to comply with his own emphasis on the need to treat each 
conlictual context separately and approach each situation according to 
its unique nature and the particular hermeneutical engagement of the 
religious actors involved.
Gopin’s concluding remarks, unlike his practically grounded and broad 
recommendations, provide an overly idealistic world view, in which he 
argues that militant religion will only disappear once ‘global civilisation 
develops into a serious human community with a set of high ideals that 
are perceived and actually are substantive and attractive from a spiritual 
and ethical point of view’ (2000, 223). Whether or when this will happen 
is impossible to say, but his theological observations and practical rec-
ommendations do show the potential for the successful incorporation of 
religion into conlict resolution.
In another work, Gopin (2001) examines the role of forgiveness in 
conlict resolution (as opposed to justice) and approaches this question 
by studying the concept of forgiveness in several religions, a theme 
also covered by Helmick and Petersen (2001) in an edited volume. They 
argue that forgiveness as a tool in conlict resolution can be effective 
only if it is used to cross religious boundaries and is transferred from the 
individual to the political arena. Hadley (2001) expanded on this analysis 
by examining how restorative justice inds expression in religious 
traditions worldwide. 
Religious leaders and religious organisations
A rich strand of research – including a number of works commis-
sioned by DFID – has examined the role of faith-based organisations 
and religious leaders in promoting the peaceful resolution of conlicts 
through mediation. Faith-based mediation is seen as an important 
contributor to conlict resolution and peace. However, no work sees this 
as a complete substitute to traditional diplomatic avenues. The pioneer-
ing work of Johnston and Sampson (1994) brought together scholars 
emphasising the comparative advantage of religious actors. Basing their 
indings on case studies from East Germany, Philippines, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, they argued that individuals that based their work on 
either religious or spiritual thinking were in a better place to reach out to 
regional and local actors than were politicians that did not. Similarly, Cox 
et al. (1994) argued that religion can be well suited for resolving particu-
larly prolonged, stalemated or intractable conlicts. The key characteris-
tics associated with (typically local) religious leaders that enable them to 
help in situations of conlict include authority, trust, professionalism and 
British Academy // The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding 35
also cultural and practical/experiential closeness to the people involved 
(see among others: Lederach 1996; 1997; Smock 2002). 
On a pragmatic level, especially when conlict resolution and peace-
keeping are proceeding in collaboration with development programmes, 
religious organisations and leaders have also proven particularly effec-
tive in delivering aid and effective development projects. This is because 
faith communities, in addition to being trusted, are inexpensive and they 
work rapidly, relying on wide networks of volunteers that are fervently 
devoted to the cause and ready to put their lives on the line. This has 
proven to be more effective than the work of the salaried staff of large 
and bureaucratic international organisations and secular NGOs (Barnett 
and Stein 2012).
Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) focus on the conditions condu-
cive to the success of faith-based mediation, inding that the legitimacy 
and leverage of religious actors can be powerful factors in promoting 
successful mediation processes. Aroua (2010) makes a case for media-
tors who have a deep understanding of religious beliefs and ideals, 
which enables them to promote interreligious dialogue by translating 
codes from one value system to another (‘mediators as translators’). 
Funk and Woolner (2001) emphasise the role of inter-faith dialogue in 
promoting conlict resolution. 
Even when peace processes do not lead to a sustainable peace, 
religion is nonetheless thought to positively contribute to peace as it 
can help build trust between and among social groups and individuals. 
Scholars have also noted that many conlicts do not have a religious 
component, but that even when that is the case religious leaders can 
often play a beneicial role in promoting peace (Aroua 2010). 
Religious movements and leaders may also promote the setting of 
national and international norms on peace, and generally contribute to 
worldwide peace by changing the international discourse on religion and 
peace. The historic contribution by Martin Luther King to the spread of 
non-violent resistance and international and national anti-discrimination 
laws is a prominent example for peace-generating dynamics, discussed 
extensively in the scholarly literature. 
Case studies have analysed the transformative power of religion and 
contributed to scholarly thinking on what religions have in common, 
rather than on what divides them. Appleby (2001) gives examples from 
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different faith traditions: the Catholic NGO Sant’Egidio that promotes 
ethical values in conlict situations in Africa and uses mediation as 
a tool to promote peace; Buddhist actors promoting human rights in 
Cambodia; and Muslim communities that successfully promote peace 
in parts of the Middle East. More recently, his work has focused on 
‘Catholic approaches to peacebuilding’, looking at the work of many 
transnational Catholic NGOs such as Caritas, and exploring how Catholic 
social teaching and the ‘preferential option for the poor’ have been 
gradually expanded to go beyond social and economic development, 
towards ‘reconciliation’ (Schreiter et al. 2010). Michel (2008) speciically 
focuses on the role that transnational Islamic movements play in 
fostering non-violent relations in the Muslim world. The commitment 
to positive societal change, personal transformation, and interreligious 
dialogue is fundamental for these movements. ‘Study’ and ‘service’ 
are key elements underpinning the thinking of their adherents 
(Michel 2008).
Douglas Johnston (2005) also emphasised the crucial role of faith-based 
organisations in conlict prevention and resolution. He concludes that 
local organisations can have direct inluence within their societies and 
be particularly effective, as they promote indigenous ways of preventing 
and resolving conlict and can have important moral authority because 
they are anchored in local communities. 
Weingardt (2007) provided a thorough examination of the peace 
potential of religions, their inherent positive power, and speciically the 
role of religious leaders. His irst main argument is that more research is 
needed to understand the role religions can play in de-escalating violent 
political conlicts and promoting peace. Whereas mainstream scholarly 
thinking, in particular in the wake of Huntington’s work (1993, 1997), 
focused on the negative role that religion has played in conlicts around 
the world and throughout history, Weingardt argues that religion has 
also had a positive role in preventing, controlling and ending conlicts. 
He accepts that it is dificult, if not impossible, to get a precise measure-
ment of the peace potential of religions, but maintains nonetheless that 
religions have an inherent potential for peace, and should be seen as 
a factor that contributes to de-escalating conlict.
Weingardt’s second main argument is that the peace potential of 
religions lies in the fundamentals, such as writings, teachings and 
traditions, rather than in the institutions themselves. ‘Religion-based’ 
actors (in contrast to individuals acting on faith or on the basis of an 
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institution only) base themselves on a comprehensive understanding of 
their religion and not on a narrow-minded, individualistic and potentially 
arbitrary deinition of it. By doing so, they can promote peace not only 
in religious conlicts, but also in conlicts with limited or no religious 
dimensions. Such actors can be: a) religious communities and religious 
institutions as well as their representatives; and, b) institutions, 
individuals, initiatives, movements that are not necessarily directly 
linked (i.e. inancially, institutionally or through persons) to religious 
institutions (Weingardt 2008a, 2008b).
Weingardt cites as examples Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther 
King, as well as the Quakers and Sant’Egidio, all of whom were or are 
inspired by religious values, and have used them to promote peace in 
a variety of ways, including preventing direct violence, ighting against 
structural violence and bringing about positive societal change. In 
addition, he analyses a variety of case studies (about 40) where religion 
played a positive role in conlict resolution and conlict de-escalation, 
concluding that the characteristics deining the conlicts, the actors, 
and interventions are manifold and diverse. The cultural, religious and 
political contexts, the type of conlict, the issues at stake, the conlict 
range, parties to the conlict and the outcomes of the conlict vary as 
much as conlict intensity, duration and development. The ‘religion-
based’ actors belong to different religions and confessions, work as 
individuals or in interreligious cooperation, and have varying degrees 
of institutional attachment, notoriety, political inluence and implication 
in the conlict. They also differ in their approaches to reducing violence, 
their level of interaction, methods, actions, eficiency and their impact 
on the conlict. In other words, Weingardt argues, the peace potential 
for religion is manifold; it can be used to promote peace in a variety of 
ways and there is no one way forward, but a myriad of them to exploit 
the positive power inherent in religions. 
Weingardt (2008a, 2008b) does not stop with this rather obvious 
analysis. The violent conlicts that he analyses share two main similari-
ties. One is that previous secular activities to reduce violence have 
not had satisfactory results, and the second is that decidedly religious 
elements participating in actual activities to reduce violence are of 
only limited signiicance and are thus not suficient to explain concrete 
positive results. It is therefore important to understand what is common 
to ‘religion-based’ actors and also what is the basis of their power to 
transform conlicts. He argues that these actors share three character-
istics. The irst is professional expertise, or conlict-speciic knowledge. 
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The second is credibility, or perception of the actors as neutral and fair 
by the parties in conlict. The third is closeness to the conlict, namely 
emotional, personal, and/or human proximity of the actors to the conlict 
parties and/or the conlict. 
The conidence and trust that religion-based actors inspire in the 
parties to the conlict depend on these three characteristics, building 
conidence in their professional and conlict-speciic qualiications, 
in their ethical and moral qualiications, and also in their emotional 
qualiications. Weingardt (2008a, 2008b) argues that all actors that want 
to promote peace should ideally have these characteristics, but he also 
contends that ‘religion-based’ actors have a comparative advantage: 
they often have a credit of trust. 
There are three main reasons for this credit of trust. First is that 
reference to religious thinking can be used in all cultures as a means 
to justify – in a comprehensible and legitimate way – peaceful and 
non-violent conlict resolution. Secondly, conlict parties often 
see ‘religion-based’ actors as able and willing to consider not just 
obvious facts, but also underlying and profound dimensions of 
conlict resolution, such as morality, responsibility, reconciliation, 
and forgiveness. Lastly, ‘religion-based’ actors, in contrast to secular 
actors, are often perceived to be driven less by self-interest than by 
considerations of general interest of all.
Deep and widespread respect for religion underlies these perceptions 
by conlict parties, even though religion can also have negative 
connotations. Weingardt’s general view (2007, 2008a, 2008b) is that 
this respect can be attributed to a general – but certainly not universal – 
taboo on attacking religious dignitaries or religious sites. He maintains 
that conlicts in which the religious afiliation of the adversary is used 
to legitimise violence are the exception and not the rule, and that 
even in these conlicts (e.g. in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Israel-Palestine), 
direct attacks on religious leaders and sites constitute a red line. 
In the same way as religious leaders are respected, ‘religion-based’ 
actors are accorded the respect they require to promote peace. Through 
their credit of trust, it is relatively easy for them to start a conlict resolu-
tion process. In other words, religion provides an opportunity to engage 
with the conlict parties, but it is not itself a guarantee for successful 
conlict resolution. 
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A key lesson from the evidence in all this literature is that there is no 
single path for religious organisations or religious leaders to make a 
difference in conlict resolution, and that a lexible approach should be 
taken in identifying religious ‘leaders’ capable of playing a signiicant 
role. Little’s (2007) fascinating account of grassroots peacemakers 
tells how they contributed to peaceful conlict transformation because 
they were inspired by religious values and ideals, and they used 
religion-speciic mediation and dialogue tools and communication 
techniques. He argues that policymakers have not yet suficiently taken 
into consideration the need to promote grassroots peacemakers and 
include tools inspired by religion in their toolkit. The religious actors 
presented in his case studies are often ordinary clerics, not people in 
positions of power, and some were even ostracised in their respective 
communities precisely because of their courageous steps to promote 
reconciliation in the face of dominating prejudice. Their endeavours were 
successful because of a combination of qualities and circumstances 
and the individual ways in which religious beliefs and resources were 
used. Thus, the communication strategies, language, and symbolism at 
play in each situation were different, indicating that the outcomes were 
highly context-speciic, including also the personality of the religious 
igure leading the peace initiative, even if sometimes the same religious 
tradition was present in different case studies.
4.5. Ways to promote the transformative power of religion
A further strand of academic literature on religion, conlict and 
peace is oriented around policy and action. It asks in which ways 
the transformative power of religion and its potential can be used 
to unite societies and to promote peaceful international relations. 
Lederach (1996, 1997) argued for and also developed conlict resolution 
mechanisms that focus on culture and religion as positive tools for 
bringing about change and for promoting a holistic approach, rather than 
an antagonistic approach that divides societies along religious lines. 
Faith-based peacemaking, for Johnston and Cox (2003, 15–18), is more 
about ‘reconciliation’ than about ‘conlict resolution’, that is, it centres on 
‘restoration of healthy and respectful relationships between the parties’. 
This type of intervention in a conlict situation entails four components. 
First, it offers a ‘new (moral) vision’ of how reality and relationships 
with one another can be. Secondly, it builds ‘bridges’, i.e. ‘tangible 
and intangible connections between diverse groups so that they can 
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communicate their respective needs and aspirations’. It also ‘heals’ 
the actual conlict, usually through mediation, and lastly, it also ‘heals 
the wounds of history’, which would otherwise inhibit future healthy 
relationships.
Complementary to this is the analysis of different stages of religious 
conlict transformation provided by Appleby (2000). He argues that 
transformation of religious conlict should take place at all levels of the 
conlict cycle. Several tools are involved. One is ‘conlict management’, 
which needs to be supported by raising public awareness about conlict 
drivers and origins. Another is ‘conlict resolution’, which should be 
based on dialogue and educational activities to promote understanding 
of the Other. In addition, mediation activities and good ofices need to 
be undertaken by religious leaders. Other tools are ‘post- conlict peace-
building’ and ‘structural reform’, which require intervention by religious 
leaders and organisations through humanitarian activities, and social 
integration activities, particularly for the most vulnerable and poorest 
parts of society. 
Appleby also identiies three modes of religious conlict transformation. 
First is ‘crisis mobilisation’, the social mobilisation inspired by religion 
during an acute crisis, such as the non-violent opposition by Gandhi to 
British colonial rule. Second is the ‘saturation mode’, or the long-term 
peace work at different levels of society that leads to the institutionalisa-
tion of peacebuilding activities within a society, such as the peace work 
done in Northern Ireland for several decades. Third is the ‘interventionist 
mode’, or activities undertaken by religious actors, internal and external, 
such as mediation and training activities.
An important body of literature offers practical advice on how to 
promote interreligious dialogue, and to use religion for peacebuilding 
purposes. Steele (2011) emphasises the need for long-term commit-
ment to transforming societies to build peace. Other scholars stress 
that when dealing with conlict situations, practical problems should be 
addressed irst, before value differences are tackled with respect and 
common understanding. 
Academics in this ield argue from either an experientialist (e.g. Marc 
Gopin) or a constructivist perspective (e.g. Jean-Nicolas Bitter 2003, 
2009). Experientialists focus on individual experiences, based on 
the fact that devotees all share experiences of spirituality – this is 
the common feature of religions worldwide – and can thus come to 
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a mutual understanding of conlicts and ultimately promote conlict 
resolution. Constructivists, on the other hand, see religion as a means 
for the members of a society to obtain orientation and guidance. 
Religion can thus help its members to create meaning and provide an 
understanding of conlict drivers. Gopin (2000) argued that policymakers 
need to develop and actively promote the potential of religions to cope 
with violence and overcome conlict, that religions can help societies 
to develop a shared vision of joint responsibility and commitment, and 
that the in-depth study of religious value systems can help us to better 
understand conlict drivers within religions, and eventually turn them 
into peacebuilding factors. 
The experientialist and the constructivist approach are both non-
functionalist approaches. They see religion as a set of norms and rules 
that directly form the reality that its adherents experience. In contrast, 
functionalist approaches emphasise the ways in which religion can 
be used to decode and decipher principles, norms and rules within 
a society, and thus contribute to an understanding of the perceptions 
and values of conlict actors (Aroua 2010). 
Scholars apply these different theories to case studies to analyse the 
transformative power of religion. Looking at local conlicts between 
Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria, Smock (1995, 2002, 2009) 
emphasises the bridging, universal role of religion, based on individual 
spiritual experiences of the devotees (experientialist approach). Bitter 
(2009) examines to what extent religious beliefs divide people in Tajik-
istan, and shows, nonetheless, how peace can be promoted with practi-
cal activities that address concrete problems (constructivist approach). 
From a more practical perspective, Weingardt (2008a, 2008b) 
establishes a list of factors that in his view can strengthen the role of 
‘religion-based’ actors in promoting peace, based on a thorough analysis 
of case studies from around the world. It is worth summarising these 
points here. 
1. ‘Religion-based’ actors need suficient inancial, technical and human 
resources for expert training, networking activities, public relations 
campaigns, human rights monitoring, electoral observation, conlict 
prevention and reconciliation projects. 
2. Internal ‘religion-based’ actors are needed. Even if external 
actors want to get engaged in conlict resolution activities, they 
are more likely to succeed if they rely on internal actors in the 
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conlict. Yet, Weingardt argues, such actors need to be identiied, 
strengthened and supported over the long run, through support to 
relevant organisations and actors through trainings, cooperation, 
and networking. The value of involving faith-based grassroots actors 
and whole indigenous communities, and not just religious leaders, 
is reiterated by a number of scholars (see among others Little 2007; 
Lederach 1997; Johnston 2003, 2005).
3. Religious education should focus on the positive aspects of religion. 
Whereas ‘religious analphabetism’ (or illiteracy) per se does 
not lead to conlict (see also Appleby 2000), religious education 
that focuses predominantly on the confrontational and violence-
supporting elements of religion can be exploited by political and 
religious leaders to promote violence and foil peace processes. 
Thus, education on the peaceful elements of one’s own religion 
and of those of other people can be a strong factor for building 
resilience against violence. The US State Department and the UK 
Foreign & Commonwealth Ofice have already been taken up this 
recommendation, and set up training programmes on religious 
literacy for their personnel, even though participation in both 
schemes is on a voluntary basis (Mandaville and Silvestri 2015).
4. Moderate religious leaders need to be supported. The crucial 
role played by moderate religious leaders has been widely 
acknowledged. Weingardt (2008a, 2008b) believes that the 
international community should support these leaders early on and 
that their role as partners in dialogue and cooperation should be 
strengthened to counteract fundamentalist tendencies in religion. 
This last point recommending support for moderate religious leaders, 
however, deserves some critical consideration because of some 
inherent hidden downsides. First, it may prove very dificult to identify 
such leaders, partly because of shifting alliances that they may develop 
and because it may be a challenge for the layperson to establish the 
criteria by which a religious leader can be categorised as ‘moderate’. 
Second, a focus on leaders is likely to ignore the voice of women as 
most organised religions are structured along patriarchal lines, but 
women have proven to be important actors, often operating on the 
domestic level both in promoting peace and in condoning violence 
(Gnanadason, Kanyoro and McSpadden 1996; Skidmore and Lawrence 
2007). Third, when governments or diplomats interfere in the religious 
sphere and start sponsoring particular faith groups or individuals, the 
autonomy and legitimacy of the latter often become tarnished in the 
eyes of their own religious communities. This was very clear in the 
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UK when the government attempted to promote moderate Islam in 
the context of the counterterrorism policy, ‘Prevent’, in the course of 
the 2000s. Among British Muslim communities, it was felt that those 
organisations and individuals that had engaged with the government 
or received state funding had lost credibility (see Silvestri 2010).
Galtung (2012) calls upon international leaders to explore the ‘enor-
mous reservoirs of experience’ that are presented by religions. He 
emphasises that the insights of religions can help societies to judge 
political developments. For him, religions provide a ‘toolbox’ to promote 
peace; ‘their comparative advantage is their transcendence perspec-
tive’ (Galtung 2012). He believes that different religions can be used to 
address different forms of violence. Buddhism, for example, provides 
perspectives on how to address direct violence; Islam can be used to 
ight against structural violence. However, more research needs to be 
done to fully understand the lessons that can be learnt from different 
religions. Similarly, Stückelberger (2012) argues that research in peace 
studies has not yet succeeded in fully understanding the ‘instrumen-
talisation’, of religion, or how it can be organised and adapted for their 
discipline. Again, more research is needed to grasp the complexity of 
economic, social, political and ethnic forces. Stückelberger (2012) also 
warns that excluding religion is a way to postpone problems not to solve 
them; moreover, integrating religion early can pre-empt the emergence 
of violent fundamentalism before it is too late. 
Johnston and Cox (2003, 14) provide a systematic elaboration of the 
attributes that enable religious leaders and religious institutions to inlu-
ence peacemaking . These actors have ‘well established and pervasive 
inluence in the community’ and typically (though not always) a ‘reputa-
tion as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values’. 
They also have a ‘unique leverage for reconciling conliction parties, 
including an ability to rehumanize relationships’ and they possess the 
‘capability to mobilize community, national, and international support 
for a peace process’. But most importantly, they exert ‘a transcendent 
authority for their followers that is the envy of most temporal leaders’. 
Some scholars have developed models for speciic activities to promote 
the positive force of religion. Abu-Nimer (2001) described a training 
model of interreligious peacebuilding, which he sees playing a funda-
mental, central role in transforming conlicts, given the crucial place that 
religious identities have and have had in many conlicts, such as those in 
Northern Ireland, the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. Interreligious 
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training should focus on the individual experiences of practitioners and 
they should be encouraged to share their positive experiences. Using 
a religious narrative to describe peacebuilding and conlict resolution 
activities can help parties to the conlict better understand and accept 
outside interveners. Any such training should help the participants 
expand their perception of a conlict from one that is narrow-minded to 
a perspective that is open-minded and tolerant. As its main objective, in-
terreligious peacebuilding should strive to change the attitudes towards 
the Other. Changing attitudes is a process requiring several steps, which 
has been used for a long time in training workshops on conlict resolu-
tion. Abu-Nimer argues that a combination of both the elicitive model, 
which focuses on the participants’ experiences, and the prescriptive 
model, which focuses on the trainers’ experiences and their sharing of 
those experiences with the participants, is more effective than either of 
the two models on their own. For Abu-Nimer, an ideal training workshop 
consists of ive phases: ‘Getting started’, ‘Situating our work’, ‘Know 
where you stand’, ‘Meet the other’, and ‘What can we do together?’ 
(Abu-Nimer 2001, 691). These phases should help participants explore 
their identities and understand the identities of others. The aim is both 
to share and understand commonalities, such as common values and 
understandings of society and conlict, and also to relect on differenc-
es, on their potential for conlict and advantages in promoting peace-
building. Ultimately, the participants should be encouraged to search for 
future activities to resolve conlicts peacefully. 
For Abu-Nimer (2003), interreligious training needs to be deeply 
anchored in the religions of its participants. In other words, training for 
peacemakers must be based on a narrative that originates with the 
teachings, scriptures and traditions of the religions of these peacemak-
ers. As discussed in Section 4.4, he argues that Islam is based on 
fundamentally humane concepts and has developed a whole set of 
non-violent tools for conlict resolution, but that many Muslims do not 
have suficient knowledge of the Islamic tradition and experience in 
peacebuilding. Hence there is a need not only to train Westerners in 
non-Western modes and rituals of conlict resolution, but also to support 
the emergence of indigenous (non-Western) actors able to articulate the 
search for peace from within their own faith tradition.
Stewart (2009, 31) argues in favour of improved monitoring and early 
warning mechanisms, noting that in ‘most conlicts, both religious and 
ethnic, there are many warning signs, often recorded by independ-
ent observers, frequently ignored by decision-makers for a variety of 
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reasons’. For policymakers, these warning signs and the time span 
needed to mobilise a population for violent conlict provide important 
opportunities for the international community to intervene: ‘The need 
for both religious and ethnic leaders to work at mobilisation for some 
time preceding a conlict gives rise to possibilities of monitoring and 
intervention to prevent conlict occurring’ (Stewart 2009, 1). 
In recent years, there have been reports that evaluate faith-based dia-
logue programmes. These provide a good assessment of practical chal-
lenges to such dialogue and point to the need for additional research. 
Garinkel’s 2004 report, What Works? Evaluating Interfaith Dialogue 
Programs, is an attempt to provide a rigorous analysis of how such 
programmes can enhance religious tolerance and transform societies. 
It argues that religious dialogue programmes need to include religious 
dimensions at all stages of the project. 
5.  Case study I: Religion 
and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conlict
5.1. Background
The conlict between Israel and the Palestinians is widely seen as 
a nationalist struggle, where both sides are concerned with issues 
of ‘security, sovereignty and self-determination’ and not on building 
a state based on Islamic sharia or Jewish halakhic laws (Frisch and 
Sandler 2004, 78). The roots of the modern-day conlict are identiied in 
‘ethno-political’ differences that emerged in the late nineteenth century 
(Milton-Edwards 2006), since both ‘Israeli Jews and Palestinians have 
legitimate and inalienable rights … which are rooted in the historical 
experience of each people, rather than other factors’ (Tessler 1994, xi). 
Fox and Sandler (2004) and Frisch and Sandler (2004) argue that the 
nationalist and state-centric identity of the Israeli-Palestinian conlict 
is partially due to the norms of the international system, of which both 
sides wish to be a part. 
Despite the dominance of national identity in both the causation and 
development of the conlict, religion and religious aspirations have 
also played a role in the conlict, in many ways intensifying it (Fox and 
Sandler 2004). It has been argued that the conlict has been ‘religicised’ 
(Milton-Edwards 2006), so that growing religious elements are used 
to perpetuate rather than resolve it. In his study of the role of religion 
in ethnic conlicts, Fox (2000a, 17) argues that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conlict conforms to the model in which secular conlicts, those fought 
over national rather than theocratic claims, often ‘evoke the use of reli-
gious legitimacy and institutions’ and, in doing so, can be transformed 
into religious conlicts. However, while religion is used to ‘promote the 
national struggle’ in almost all cases, the governing bodies will not let 
religion become dominant in a way that would ‘threaten their collective 
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candidacy in the exclusive club of territorial nation-states’ (Frisch and 
Sandler 2004, 93).
The injection of religion into the conlict can be seen among both 
Israelis and Palestinians in the emergence of groups inspired by religion 
that reject compromise on the basis of religious reasoning, and often 
promote violence in order to achieve their goals. There are similarities in 
the use of religion and violence by the two sides, although the religious 
concepts, the ways in which violence is employed, and the identities 
of those considered to be religious actors highlight differences both 
between the two peoples and among the various groups concerned. 
On the Palestinian side, there is a very clear link between religion, 
conlict and violence, in the cases of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Move-
ment) and Islamic Jihad. According to the former, ‘the Palestinian cause 
is not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief’ (Islamic Resist-
ance Movement cited in Litvak 1998, 148). Hamas has used religion to 
legitimise the use of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conlict (Singh 
2012) but also, in line with Fox’s (2000a) argument, to gain power in the 
Palestinian nationalist political landscape. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
promote the use of suicide bombings against Israel. However, in a study 
of martyrs, it was found that individuals engaged in suicide terrorism 
in the Second Intifada had several motivations and not only religious 
ones (Moghadam 2003). Given the changing political reality of the Oslo 
Accords, Hamas shifted to promote a non-violent, social jihad along-
side a military one encouraging the Islamisation of Palestinian society 
(Hatina 1999). 
Based on extensive ieldwork in Gaza, Gunning (2009) has provided 
a detailed study of Hamas’ evolution as both a political party and 
a religious and civil society actor able to mobilise and strategically 
articulate its political thought. His analysis pays particular attention to 
the structural and historical context within which Hamas has operated, 
and to the way in which the movement’s political theory has been 
coherent with its political practice. This sophisticated and rounded 
picture thus enables Gunning to elaborate on the power of this actor 
beyond its religious identity, and to criticise simplistic labels of Hamas 
as a terrorist organisation.
Fatah, on the other hand, while imbuing its speeches and publications 
with Islamic symbols (Frisch 2005), was essentially a secular nationalist 
movement, which aimed to play by the rules of the international system. 
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However, during the Second Intifadah, they were under pressure both 
to encourage and to adopt suicide bombings as a strategy (Luft 2002). 
The emergence of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the military wing of 
Fatah, which conducted suicide bombings during the Second Intifadah, 
was not, however, a shift towards the Islamisation of Fatah. Rather it 
was a strategy of the nationalist organisation to use Islamic symbols 
and allusions to mobilise the public for Palestinian nationalist goals and, 
in fact, to discourage the rise of Islamic movements (Frisch 2005; Luft 
2002). For Fatah, Islam was used as a means to an end, whereas for 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Islam itself was the end. According to Milton-
Edwards (2006, 72) the growing religious dimension and the rise of 
Islamist movements in the region should be seen not as fundamentalist 
movements but as resurgent movements, ‘riding the wave’ of growing 
Islamism, both internally and externally, for the sake of a wider struggle 
over ‘territoriality, identity, ethnicity, economy, nationalism, colonialism 
and imperialism’, as well as over religion.
On the Jewish side, religious-inspired violence within the Israeli-
Palestinian conlict is more commonly seen among extra-parliamentary 
groups, although with links to political parties. The aftermath of the 
Six-Day War in 1967 and the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978 
triggered the emergence of the extreme right (Hecht 1993), steeped 
in messianic religiosity but constrained by political realities (Sprinzak 
1991a). Some argue that there were precursors to this in the religious 
objection to the Israeli Proclamation of Independence (Peleg 1997), 
which included universal values of equality between religions and races 
in Israel and such grievances with secular Israel played a role in the re-
course to violence. Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) emerged, claim-
ing that Judea and Samaria (West Bank), which had been conquered 
in the war, were ‘inalienable and non-negotiable…because God had 
promised them to Abraham’ (Sprinzak 1987, 203). According to Sprinzak 
(1998, 1991a, 1987), the violence of Gush Emunim was incremental 
because of the combination of a messianic belief in redemption and the 
context of a national conlict. They were mainly a vigilante movement, 
aimed at combatting the failures of the Israeli authorities to protect the 
settlers against Arabs in the territories and to maintain order in the West 
Bank. The violence was therefore not religiously motivated, although the 
rabbis opposed none of their actions (Sprinzak 1987). 
A Jewish Underground emerged as a revitalisation movement in 
response to internal changes in Gush Emunim (Sprinzak 1999; 1991a), 
which included pragmatic decisions that led to the subordination of 
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religious concepts to the moral authority of the state (Taub 2007). 
They were against subservience of traditional Jewish norms of religious 
observation to the secular government in Israel, and believed in the 
institutionalisation of Jewish theocracy (Sprinzak, 1987). They sought 
to blow up the Dome of the Rock, clearly a religiously motivated act of 
violence, one that Gush Emunim would not have thought of (Sprinzak 
1987). Based on Kahanist ideology, they believed that ‘Jewish violence 
in defence of Jewish interest is never bad’ (Sprinzak 1991b, 56). 
In more recent years the ‘Hilltop Youth’ have emerged as second and 
third generation religious-nationalist settlers, mobilised by the failure 
of the older generation to halt the 2005 Gaza Disengagement. They 
engage in ‘price tag’ attacks, which are physical acts of violence and 
desecration of mosques when compromises are made with the Pales-
tinians or settlements are demolished, and unlike their parents, they do 
not afiliate with traditional religious authorities (Boudreau 2014; Byman 
and Sachs 2012). Their overriding goal is to ‘deter Israeli leaders from 
implementing a possible future Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement 
that entails removing Israeli settlements from the West Bank’ (Nir 2011, 
277). Carton (2011) argues that while their actions are religiously moti-
vated, there are also sociological, psychological and political inluences.
While a minority of Israeli Jews undertake acts of Jewish terrorism, 
Hecht (1993, 14) argued that they should not be viewed as ‘an isolated 
extremist faction’ but as a ‘very inluential school that has been push-
ing the entire Israeli right towards greater ultra-nationalism, greater 
extra-legalism, greater militarism, greater ethnocentrism, and greater 
religiosity’. Although Hecht’s remark was made over two decades ago, 
the outcome of the Israeli elections of March 2015 and the ensuing 
alliance between the right-wing Likud Party and ultra-orthodox groups 
appear to conirm the societal shift towards greater ethnocentrism and 
religiosity. The ‘amalgamation of ultra-orthodox religious doctrines with 
ideas of nationalism’ is said to have caused the violence employed by 
the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Sandler 1996, 148–149). 
Religious nationalists are at the forefront of opposing any peace process 
that involves territorial withdrawal, resulting in non-Jewish control of 
any part of the Land of Israel (Newman 2005). Peace, however, is not 
negated by these groups, as their concept is religious, accompanying 
ultimate redemption (Newman and Hermann 1992).
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5.2. Religious concepts 
In the ‘Readings in the Laws of Martyrdom’ of the Islamic Jihad there is 
an intertwining of religion and politics (Hatina 2005). The word ‘shaheed’ 
(Muslim martyr), itself denotes a religious concept (Moghadam 2003), 
and the religious doctrine of jihad (holy war) is referenced in the mani-
festos of Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Fatah (Frisch 2005; Hatina 2005). 
This refers to the ‘moral superiority of Islam’ over inidels and other 
cultures (Hatina 2005, 242). The religious concepts of jihad and shaheed 
are closely linked to modern secular concepts of ‘thawra’ (revolution) 
and ‘ida’i’ (sacriice) (Johnson cited in Hatina 2005). Given the identi-
ication of Palestine as an Islamic ‘Waqf’ or trust, jihad is central in the 
struggle for a Palestinian state (Singh 2012). For radical Islamists, ‘the 
fall of Jerusalem into inidel hands is perceived as a wound that must be 
healed’ (al-Khalifa Khutba, cited in Milton-Edwards 2006, 79). Ignoring 
jihad is considered a sin and the highest way to please Allah is the inten-
tion (‘niya’) of becoming a martyr (Hatina 2005). Martyrdom comes with 
the Islamic promise of an ‘afterlife replete with gold, palaces, feasts and 
virgin brides’ (Kushner 1996, 333), as understood from some readings of 
Surah 78 of the Qur’an and according to a weak Hadith tradition.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conlict, the belief that ‘only Islam and not 
nationalism could liberate Muslims from foreign (inidel) rule’ (Milton-
Edwards 2006, 83), highlights both the Islamic nature of the struggle 
but also the general coninement of the movements to the liberation of 
Palestine rather than a global jihad. The concept ‘al-siyasa al shar’yya’ 
(subject to political considerations) enabled warfare to include a 
defensive jihad that allows killing of civilians (Hatina 2005). Unlike Fatah, 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad both aim to implement sharia law in Palestine 
and to rule over the inidels. The pragmatic approach of Hamas to agree 
to ceaseires is explained by the Treaty of Hudabiyya, in which, deriving 
from the behaviour of the Prophet, Islam gives permission for peace to 
be made with an enemy for a speciic period of time, no longer than ten 
years (Hatina 1999). 
The religious concepts of Gush Emunim are based on the teachings 
of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, who stated that ‘ours is a messianic age in 
which the Land of Israel, in its entirety is to be reunited’ (Sprinzak 1987, 
198). The Israeli demand to settle in Judea and Samaria is based on 
God’s promise to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob made 5,000 years earlier 
(Jones 1999; Lustick 1987; Sprinzak 1987). Furthermore, redemption 
and the ‘End of Days’ would be possible only in the Greater Land of 
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Israel, and so territorial compromise ‘means forfeiting redemption’ 
(Sprinzak 1987, 203). The Holocaust and the Arab-Israeli wars are 
explained as part of the redemption period of the Messiah Son of 
Joseph, who would ultimately fail, but as an integral part of the process 
(Lustick 1987). Kook believed that the Israeli government was legitimate 
in the process towards redemption (Sprinzak 1987). However, there 
was a halakhic edict that prohibited the evacuation of settlements in the 
Land of Israel, and even a call for soldiers to disobey orders in the Gaza 
disengagement (Arboff 1999). 
Rabbi Kahane promoted a more violent interpretation, although he 
believed his was coming directly from the Halakha, or Jewish religious 
law (Sprinzak 1991b). He believed in the necessity of a physical struggle 
against the Gentiles, with ‘Jewish violence sanctiied and gloriied for 
its own sake’, since it ‘proves the might of God by reversing the history 
of humiliation’ (Sprinzak 1998, 120). Kahane argued that God could 
no longer put up with humiliation after the Holocaust and created the 
State of Israel as revenge against the Gentiles, with ‘the very deinition 
of Jewish freedom implying the ability to humiliate Gentiles’ (Sprinzak 
1991b, 50). Concepts such as ‘Kiddush Hashem’ (sanctifying the name 
of God) are used to justify grave acts of terror, including the 1994 
Hebron massacre and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
(Sprinzak 1998). Sprinzak (1998) also explains the use of certain rulings 
that underpinned the attack on Rabin, although there was no Rabbinical 
sanction. ‘Din Rodef’ refers to a ruling against someone who provides 
Gentiles with information about Jews or gives them Jewish property 
and ‘din moser’ refers to the ruling on Jews who surrender Jews to 
Gentiles. Jews are obliged to kill a ‘moser’ (a Gentile that surrenders 
Jews to Gentiles) without trial (Sprinzak 1998). Kahane also called for 
violence against Jewish Hellenists (Boudreau 2014), that is those open 
to the iniltration of Western values into Judaism. This underpinned 
some of the ‘price tag’ attacks against left-wing peace organisations 
in Israel. In these more radical groups, the term ‘Amalekite’ is used to 
identify enemies of the Jewish people. The Biblical story, where God 
demanded the destruction of the Amalekites by the Children of Israel, 
is used to sanctify violence (Jones 1999).
The Hill Top Youth, while inspired by the teachings of Kahane, do not use 
messianic language and the land is seen as the end in and of itself, not 
just a means to redemption. Settling the land as their biblical ancestors 
had done is their form of redemption (Carton 2001). 
52 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
5.3. Religious actors
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade all promoted 
violence with reference to Islam. Leaders of the political movements, 
as well as Sheikhs and Muftis, can be identiied as key actors. Youth 
movements played a role in education and mobilising, as did mosques. 
Individuals identiied in Frisch’s (2005) study of suicide bombing showed 
few similarities, however. They were not core members of the political 
organisations and went through a signiicant period of training from the 
organisations before undertaking the task. They were recruited from 
mosques and schools (Kushner 1996).
Rabbis played a signiicant role in inspiring certain religious worldviews 
through interpretations of the Bible and the Halakha. They were also 
consulted in order to sanction certain acts of violence; the two greatest 
acts of Jewish terrorism were conducted by a rabbi and an unconnected 
individual, who had apparently been raised with these interpretations 
(Sprinzak 1991a). A number of Kahane’s followers had been members 
of the Jewish Defense League in Brooklyn, New York, and moved to 
Israel to follow their rabbi (Friedman 1986). The Hill Top Youth are young, 
second or third generation settlers. The ideology they espouse was 
disseminated through synagogues or institutes of higher Jewish learn-
ing (Newman 2005), as well as from the Bnei Akiva youth movements, 
encouraging younger participation (Newman and Hermann 1992).
5.4. Evidence
In the case of the Palestinian studies cited here, evidence was drawn 
from speeches of leaders from the political movements, and from their 
websites (Frisch 2005). Quotes from sheikhs and muftis and publica-
tions from the organisations were also used (Moghadam 2003; Hatina 
2005), as were newspaper articles (Milton-Edwards 2006; Moghadam 
2003; Litvak 1988). In his study of the motivations for suicide bombings, 
Frisch (2005) consulted the obituaries of the martyrs. Milton-Edwards 
(2006) conducted interviews. Gunning (2009) did interviews and 
observed participants. The Qur’an and commentaries of it were also 
consulted (Hatina 1999; 2005). 
Evidence for the studies on Israel also came from a wide variety of 
sources. In particular, the writings of the leading rabbis were sourced, 
including those of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook and his students (Lustick 1987; 
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Sprinzak 1998, 1991a, 1987), and the speeches and writings of Rabbi 
Kahane (Sprinzak 1991b). The writings of the leaders of the movements 
were also consulted, including the Gush Emunim journal, Nekuda 
(Sprinzak 1998, 1991a, 1987; Friedman 1986). Newspaper articles pro-
vided evidence of attacks that had occurred and interviews with groups 
responsible (Nir 2011; Newman 2005). Some also involved primary 
interviews with settlers (Boudreau 2014). 
5.5. Confliction resolution
Bar-Siman-Tov (2010) argues that the political power of religious 
movements and their use of terrorism have the potential to prevent 
the possibility of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conlict. For this 
reason, it is necessary to diffuse the radical religious elements of both 
sides if there is to be resolution of the conlict (Bar-Siman-Tov 2010; 
Jones 1999). Moderate religious commentary from religious sources 
is needed to legitimise a political compromise and one that removes 
the ‘emotionally charged elements from religious values’ (Bar-Siman-
Tov 2010, 256). Jones (1999) noted that in the Jewish case, religious 
teachings do sanction territorial compromise but the centre-left, which 
promotes a two-state solution, gives only lip service to Judaism and it 
needs to incorporate the ‘language and values’ of religious nationalism 
if it is to gain support from religious groups and diffuse the violent 
tendencies of some of their members. Following the 1995 assassination 
of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there was a ‘conscious 
rabbinical effort to exercise control over the rhetoric of the extreme 
right and to rule out political violence’ (Sprinzak 1991a). 
Although currently based in the US, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, founder 
and director of the Salam Institute for Peace and Justice in Washington, 
DC, is a Palestinian from Israel and a major voice on interfaith reconcili-
ation. He maintains that there is a need for a process of moving from 
‘religiocentric’ perspectives to ‘religiorelative’ ones, which calls for 
interreligious awareness that focuses both on the similarities between 
the religions and their differences (Abu-Nimer 2004; 2011). Furthermore, 
religious leaders should be consulted in peace negotiations, particularly 
on religiously sensitive issues (Landau 2003). One suggestion is that 
religious leaders draft their own peace agreement alongside a politi-
cal peace agreement (Abu-Nimer 2004). The 2002 Alexandria Summit 
brought together religious leaders from the Middle East to promote 
Israeli-Palestinian peace on the basis that, ‘according to our faiths…
54 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
killing innocents in the name of God is a desecration of His Holy Name, 
and defames religion in the world’ (cited in Landau 2003, 19).
While the Israeli peace movement is said to be made up mainly of secu-
lar, middle-class Ashkenazi Jews (Hermann 2009), there are a number 
of peace organisations in Israel that are explicitly religious. Oz V’Shalom/
Netivot Shalom (Strength and Peace/ Peace) was a religious group that 
was set up in 1975 to counter the teachings of Gush Shalom. It argued 
that occupation and control of another people goes against Jewish val-
ues such as sanctity of the soul, or ‘pikuach’ (Hermann 2009), and that 
there is in fact Jewish precedent for giving away territory in the Bible 
(Jones 1999). Rabbis for Human Rights, a human rights organisation 
made up of Reform and Conservative rabbis, is based on the belief that, 
‘God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created 
him’ (Genesis 1:26–27). Eretz Shalom (Land of Peace) is a group of reli-
gious Jewish settlers who engage in peacebuilding with Palestinians in 
the West Bank, based on the leadership of Rabbi Froman who believes 
that the land does not belong to anyone and coexistence and sharing 
should be the paradigm for peace. 
Among the Palestinian non-violent resistance groups there are some 
key religious actors. One is the Mosque Protection Committee led by 
Shiek Raed Salah, who promotes a discourse of non-violent resistance 
that is rooted in the Qur’an and the Hadith (Abu-Nimer 2011). There are 
also some interreligious dialogue groups that bring together leading 
religious igures to discuss how they can promote peace (Kaufman, 
Salem and Verhoeven 2006). Jerusalem Peacemakers is one example 
of the interfaith groups working in the region. They believe that all three 
monotheistic religions should live together as the children of Abraham. 
The pioneering work of Archbishop Elias Chacour to promote tangible 
reconciliation between Jews and Palestinians in Israel is remarkable. 
A Palestinian Catholic priest, of the Melkite church, he is the founder 
and president of Mar Elias Educational Institutions in I’billin, Israel. He 
has devoted his life to facilitating mutual understanding between youths 
of different religions and ethnic backgrounds through the kindergarten, 
elementary, junior and high schools of Mar Elias College. There, stu-
dents from the three Abrahamic traditions live and study together, speak 
each others’ languages and learn about their reciprocal faith traditions.
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5.6. Women in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Both Israelis and Palestinians have used the concept of ‘motherhood’ 
to deine the role of women in the conlict. Israeli prime ministers have 
referred to women’s fertility as a national priority (Sharoni 1995), partly 
to produce future soldiers and also to ‘win’ the demographic war. In the 
1993 Hamas Charter, a similar role is assigned to Palestinian women, 
whereby they have, ‘the most important role in taking care of the 
home and raising children of ethical character and understanding that 
comes from Islam and training her children to perform the religious 
obligations in preparation for the Jihadic role that awaits them’ (cited in 
Jacoby 1999, 518). Beyond their role as mothers, women in both Israeli 
and Palestinian societies have taken an active role in aspects of the 
conlict, most clearly through the emergence of independent women’s 
or feminist movements. Religion does not seem to have an explicit role 
for women in the Israeli side, whereas either rejection of or promotion 
of Islamic teachings have played a role in the Palestinian women’s 
movement, which was particularly prominent in the First Intifada.
Women have played a signiicant role in Israeli peace activism, initially 
in the formation of the Four Mothers movement, in which women 
voiced their objection to the irst Lebanon war because of their role as 
mothers protecting their sons (Lemish and Barzel 2000). The women’s 
movement became more explicitly feminist during the First Intifada, 
with the founding of Women in Black that sought to ind legitimacy for 
their anti-occupation stance through their role as citizens, not as moth-
ers (Sharoni 1995). They sought to highlight the connection between 
women’s issues and the occupation. Since the Second Intifada, as wom-
en took up more combat roles in the Israeli Defence Forces, a new anti-
war voice emerged from their experiences where they served alongside 
men in the Occupied Territories. They criticised the immaturity of their 
male counterparts, while showing empathy for the Palestinians (Sasson-
Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011). Since the Second Intifada, there 
has been a shift in Israeli peace activism from Israeli towns to the West 
Bank, in solidarity with Palestinian activists. This has meant that Israeli 
activists, particularly women, have had to be conscious of the cultural 
differences in the West Bank villages, and dress appropriately for the 
demonstrations, which has sometimes conlicted with the feminist 
ideologies of the Israeli activists (Fleischmann n.d.).
Religion has played a greater role in mobilising Palestinian women. 
The mobilisation of Palestinian women to the nationalist cause was 
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most prominent in the First Intifada, which is generally seen as a non-
violent uprising. The emergence of a Palestinian women’s movement 
dealt not only with the nationalist struggle but also simultaneously 
focused on women’s issues. Jacoby (1999) identiies three strands 
of the women’s movement. One is an explicitly secular movement 
formed from the communist and Marxist factions, another an Islamic 
women’s movement promoting sharia law, and third is a Muslim 
women’s movement that sought to ‘rearticulate Sharia to accommodate 
indigenous feminism’ (Jacoby 1999, 521). According to Hasso (1998), 
the Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees, an afiliate 
of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with its anti-
religious Marxist roots, was the largest and most inluential women’s 
organisation during the First Intifada. However, in recruiting women, 
they had to de-emphasise their anti-religious beliefs. The rise of Hamas 
in the second year of the First Intifada and their imposition of the hijab 
on women in Gaza then created dificulties for the progressive women’s 
movement (Berkovitch and Moghadam 1999). This created a space 
for the Islamist women’s groups to provide ‘an “authentic” space for 
women … to organise without having to worry about violating social 
norms’ (Berkovitch and Moghadam 1999, 650). Jacoby (1999) notes 
the complexity between feminism, nationalism and religion in Palestine, 
suggesting that the motivations for joining the women’s nationalist 
struggle in the First Intifada came from a spectrum of religious beliefs 
that highlighted different roles for women in the conlict. 
While religion may not be a shared driving force for Israeli and 
Palestinian women seeking to change the status quo and work towards 
peace, it has been argued that their identity as women has enabled 
them to transcend the Israeli-Palestinian/Jewish-Muslim-Christian 
divides and connect more easily than men. Their shared experience of 
gender oppression has helped them to cross the national and religious 
boundaries (Sharoni 1995). According to Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven 
(2006), during the Second Intifada, joint Israeli-Palestinian activities in 
general declined but this decline was not as signiicant for joint activities 
of women’s organisations. 
6. Case study II: Mali
6.1. Background
Mali has experienced a long history of conlict between the centre and 
its periphery. Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali, which pitted parts of the 
population in the north of the country against the central government 
in the capital Bamako and the population in the south have shaken this 
West African country for decades. There have been numerous attempts 
at conlict resolution, including some by the international community. 
None of those has led to sustainable peacebuilding. In 2012, another 
Tuareg rebellion brought to the fore the rising inluence of the Tuareg 
national liberation movement (MNLA: Mouvement national pour la 
libération de l’Azawad). Beneitting from a power vacuum of the central 
government due to a coup d’état, these non-state armed actors took 
control of major population centres in northern Mali, including Timbuktu, 
Gao and Kidal. This essentially secular Tuareg movement saw its 
power rapidly decline due to the advent and rise of Islamic extremist 
movements aiming to take control over large parts of North and West 
Africa and create an Islamic state. These were: Ansar Dine (Defenders 
of the Faith), a Malian Tuareg movement; the Movement for Oneness 
and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and; Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(AQIM). These movements rapidly established their terrorist rule in 
northern Mali until they were dislodged by French and African military 
intervention in January 2013, although cells and attacks continue to 
date. Peace negotiations between the Tuareg groups (and other groups 
from northern Mali) and the Government of Mali, with mediation by 
the international community, are ongoing at the time of this writing 
(August 2015). 
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6.2. Concepts
Three main concepts are used by the relevant actors in Mali to denote 
their relationship with religion.
1. The Malian state and society apparently embraced the French ideal 
of state secularism or laicity (‘laïcité’ in French), with an evident 
separation of religion and the state.
2. A moderate version of Islam, mixed with cultural traditions, 
is prevalent among the Muslim population in Mali. 
3. Extremist and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam are apparent 
among Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM. Although local religious 
groups do not use fundamentalist and radical interpretations of 
Islam, the media often frame this conlict as being connected to 
religious extremism and fundamentalism, even with regard to laic 
Tuareg groups.
6.3. Actors 
The Malian government and Malian civil society show a strong attach-
ment to laicity and the need to deine government–society relations, 
as well as inner-Malian social relations, in secular terms. Most Malians 
– 90 per cent of its population – are Muslim (predominantly Sunni), 
while approximately nine per cent practise indigenous faiths, and about 
one per cent is Christian (Coleman 2014, 175). Christian, indigenous or 
traditional religious minorities lived peacefully and were tolerated in the 
country until the recent conlict in 2012 (Jeffrey 2013). Religious free-
doms are guaranteed by the Constitution and are again being respected 
in practice after the terrorist occupation of northern Mali ended. 
The national self-determination movement MNLA publicly states its 
adherence to secular values and spoke out against the attempts by 
Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM to install sharia law in northern Mali in 
2012–2013. However, although it is an essentially secular movement, 
the MNLA created alliances with Islamist movements, in particular in 
2012, as it hoped to be able to use those movements to increase its 
power and inluence. 
AQIM and Ansar Dine propagated an extremist and radical interpretation 
of Islam and proclaimed the institution of sharia law in northern Mali. 
There were widespread human rights violations in 2012 and 2013, as 
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well as the destruction of ancient Islamic monuments, seen by Ansar 
Dine, MOJWA and AQIM as un-Islamic. Both groups are militant rather 
than religious organisations and both were established by prominent 
leaders and militia ighters of the failed Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s. 
These two factors combined, the role of the Tuareg militiamen and the 
frustration of the attempted rebellions, may explain the radical turn 
to Islam. AQIM adopted its current name only in 2007; before that its 
name was Salaist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Although 
the GSPC claimed to be religiously motivated, prior to 2007 it engaged 
primarily in local and transnational criminality, mainly the kidnapping of 
international tourists. Inspired by AQIM, Ansar Dine has also sought to 
impose radical sharia law across Mali. 
6.4. The role of religion in conflict and peace
Before the conlict escalated in 2012–2013, religion did not appear 
to play a particular role in the conlicts and in peacebuilding in Mali. 
With the rise of Islamic extremist movements in northern Mali, 
however, religion came to shape the dynamics of conlict and of 
peace processes. The implementation of sharia law in northern Mali 
from March/April 2013 to January 2014, on a scale not previously 
experienced in the country, led to a massive and rapid deterioration 
of the human rights situation. Despite the laic nature of the country, 
the violence exercised meant that the population had limited chances 
and opportunities to resist. Very quickly, the tolerant model of Islam 
practised by the populations was undermined by imposing strict rule 
based on sharia law (Primo 2013; Lecocq et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, Malian society is marked by a strong resilience to extrem-
ist Islamist thinking. Its long history of laicity and Suism, in a society 
marked by the peaceful co-existence of different religious groups and 
by fundamental human rights and freedoms, has made it dificult for 
Islamists to gain a strong foothold. AQIM relied on some marabouts, or 
local religious teachers, to preach their interpretation of Islam, but many 
marabouts would not support AQIM. Thus, it relied on a ‘pre-existing 
traditional structure of cultural importance’; to obtain their allegiance, 
AQIM paid marabouts money and provided them with cars and weap-
ons (Bøås and Torheim 2013a). In addition, AQIM applied a strategy of 
integration into local communities with the aim of overcoming its image 
as an external actor, using a combination of military, political, religious, 
economic and humanitarian means (Bøås and Torheim 2013b, 1287). 
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For all this, AQIM quickly realised that they could not win the hearts 
and minds of the population of northern Mali by imposing an extremist 
version of sharia law. In a letter found in Timbuktu the leader of AQIM 
cautions his supporters not to impose sharia too rapidly, given the 
resistance from the population (Callimachi 2013; Associated Press 
2013). Public opinion in the south of the country – and also in northern 
Mali after January 2013 – clearly exposed the incompatibility of such 
thinking with a Malian understanding of Islam. Malians also realised that 
the jihadists persecuted everyone, not just Christians and the followers 
of traditional beliefs. Rather than viewing the jihadists as ardent 
practitioners of Islam, the local population in northern Mali saw them 
as an organised crime syndicate, using their religious proile as a cover 
for criminal activities, particularly drug and human traficking (Jeffrey 
2013). For instance, a local citizen of Timbuktu said, ‘The jihadists are 
not Muslims, they are terrorists. They came here just to destroy and to 
steal. In Timbuktu we know Islam and we teach Islam, and what they 
think is something completely different’ (Jeffrey 2013, 32). 
Scholars have also pointed to the fact that religion has played only a 
secondary role in the conlict in Mali, and that Ansar Dine, MOJWA and 
AQIM instrumentalised religion to justify their violence and criminal 
activities and promote their power struggle. These movements also are 
characterised by the absence of religious leaders within their ranks and 
of a sound theological basis for their actions. Yet, they claim to be driven 
by Islamic values. Wise (2013) claims that conlict and intervention in 
northern Mali are rooted in a profound history, both Arab and Western, 
of self-interest and racism. He maintains that northern Mali has been 
invaded to further Arab interests in a black African region, and not to 
spread the Islam. Jeffrey (2013) emphasises that the current conlict 
builds on the foundations of prolonged ethnic and tribal rivalries over 
land, which have plagued the Sahel region, including northern Mali, 
for centuries. He argues that desertiication, climate changes and the 
shortage of resources exacerbate these troubles. Le Meur and Hochet 
(2010) claim that previous conlicts and rebellions in Mali were, in 
principle, about access to and control of resources; yet these conlicts 
were also strongly linked to identity and social tensions.
The peacebuilding power of religion has created important elements 
of resilience within the Malian population and has contributed to 
peacebuilding efforts, although additional efforts could be made to fully 
exploit its beneicial capacities to create sustainable peace. There is still 
a need to tell in detail the many stories of the widespread individual 
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cases of bravery and opposition to Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM in 
northern Mali. Some examples of these, such as the acts of individual 
citizens of Timbuktu, among them religious leaders (Kim 2013), to save 
their cultural heritage (their historic manuscripts, for example) are 
already in the public sphere. Reconciliation efforts, inspired by traditional 
Islamic conlict resolution models, have played a major role in Mali, 
particularly in the north of the country, to overcome ethnic divisions and 
build sustainable peace. Broad-based national and local debates, within 
all strands of the Malian society and including religious civil society 
and religious leaders, have helped to start reuniting Malian society. 
Traditional mediation efforts have also made an important contribution to 
peacebuilding in Mali (Konaté 1999), although more efforts are needed 
to further promote long-term and effective reconciliation.
Given the claim of the terrorists that they are promoting Islam, the 
importance of moderate religious leaders and moderate religious civil 
society organisations in Malian politics to counter this has increased. 
In a blog for the New York Times, Armstrong (2013) argues that the High 
Council of Islam (HCI) ‘has gradually emerged as the country’s strongest 
political force’. The High Council, in essence a civil society organisation, 
promotes a republican form of Islam. The HCI is remarkable insofar as it 
unites a whole range of people with different beliefs, from more liberal 
to the more conservative Muslims. The crisis has allowed religious 
leaders to demand a stronger role in Malian politics. At a rally for peace 
in Bamako in August 2012, the HCI was able to gather over 50,000 
people. The Malian prime minister felt obliged to attend and to show the 
backing he enjoys from the HCI. Religious civil society movements have 
played a crucial role in mitigating violence. The HCI was key in mediating 
agreements with Ansar Dine and secured the release of prisoners 
of war (Armstrong 2013). In addition, they mobilised public support, 
including inancial assistance, to help the Malian army in its ight against 
the terrorist occupation of the north of the country. 
Moreover, individual religious leaders in Mali have also played a positive 
role in conlict resolution in Mali. Although there has been strong 
criticism of the early positioning of Mahmoud Dicko, president of the 
HCI, during the arrival of Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM in northern 
Mali, he later publicly welcomed military intervention by Western 
countries, in particular France, but also the US, and did not label it as 
yet another example of the alleged US war on Islam, as US foreign 
interventions elsewhere have been called. He also argued strongly 
in favour of moderate interpretations of Islam throughout the crisis 
62 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
(Soares 2013). The international community has clearly acknowledged 
the positive role played by Mali’s traditional religious organisations 
and leaders in promoting resilience to conlict and contributing to 
peacebuilding. The current draft of a peace agreement between the 
Government of Mali and non-state armed actors in northern Mali 
emphasises the need to include traditional justice mechanisms to 
promote reconciliation, while speciically recognising the laic nature 
of the Malian state (Draft Peace Agreement for Mali 2014, chapters 
14 and 1). The UN Security Council also afirmed that terrorist, extremist 
and armed groups in the north of Mali cannot legitimately claim to speak 
in the name of any religion (United Nations 2013, preamble). 
Nevertheless, the growing role played by Muslim civil society 
organisations in southern Mali during and in the aftermath of the most 
recent crisis also led to a strengthening of extraneous conservative 
forces of Islam, with potentially negative effects on the social fabric of 
the country. This had its origins in an earlier period, particularly in that 
following political liberalisation in 1991. Attempts to liberalise family law 
in Mali have failed largely because of the strong role played by the HCI. 
Instead, in 2012, a law was passed that the international community 
and women’s groups view as compromising the rights of women. 
In addition, 2012 also saw the creation of a Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Worship, although it is yet to ind its exact place in Malian 
society. Soares (2006) observed that since September 2001, Islamic 
fundamentalism and conservative attitudes have been on the rise in 
Mali, even if only to a limited degree. Still, religious leaders, newspapers 
and radio stations did begin to raise their voices while opposing the 
inluences of neoliberal, modern and secular lifestyles and politics 
(Soares 2006). However, more research is needed to fully understand 
the slow and limited, but discernible rise of radical religious views over 
the last two decades in Mali, including in the south of the country, 
as well as the long-term effects of public views of Islam among the 
populations occupied by Ansar Dine, MOJWA, AQIM in the country’s 
north. The international community needs to support measures 
to prevent radicalisation by building upon the existing resilience 
factors in Mali.
Gender issues related to religion have also played an important role in 
the conlict in Mali. Because of the rather liberal interpretation of Islam 
in the country, women can participate to a great extent in its social, 
economic and political life, and they thus have a crucial role to play in 
the use of sustainable peacebuilding strategies. Not only have their 
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livelihoods been affected by the conlict, but they were also the irst 
to start reconciliation processes at the local level. Also, women were 
disproportionately affected by the violence in northern Mali, as armed 
groups committed widespread violations of women’s human rights due 
to their rigid interpretation of the Qur’an (Amnesty International 2012).
7. Case study III: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
7.1. Background
From April 1992 to December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the 
setting for an armed conlict involving several parties, essentially the 
military forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and those 
of Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia, self-proclaimed entities within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the break-up of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and after a referendum, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
declared independence, which was rejected both by the political leaders 
of ex-Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
a multi-ethnic political entity, the population of which comprised Muslim 
Bosnians (or Bosniaks, 44 per cent), Orthodox Serbs (31 per cent) 
and Catholic Croatians (17 per cent). War soon broke out, opposing, at 
different times, the three main ethno-religious groups. The conlict was 
marked by massive and indiscriminate war crimes, perpetuated by all 
sides, but mainly by Orthodox Serbs. International intervention by NATO 
forces eventually led to an end of the war and allowed the parties to sign 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The Dayton Agreement divided 
the country into two political entities – the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. It also made some rearrange-
ments of the cantons and provided constitutional recognition for all 
three of the recognised ethnic groups. To date, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is marked by a fragile state of peace, with strong divides between the 
different ethno-religious groups. 
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7.2. Concepts
‘Ethno-religious conlict’ and ‘ethno-religious warfare’ are the main 
terms scholars and politicians use to denote the religious dimension of 
the conlict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The countries of ex-Yugoslavia 
are characterised by the fact that the various communities are marked 
by their afiliations with speciic religions. Their ethnic and religious 
identities overlap. Academics, in particular ethnologists, differ in their 
assessment of which identity – the religious or the ethnic – is predomi-
nant. Most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina tend to identify with their 
religion rather than with the state. Political and religious leaders of the 
three groups also emphasise the long-standing historic oppression of 
their respective religions or religious persecution. Ethno-nationalism is 
also prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the members belong-
ing to a nation are deined in terms of ethnicity rather than citizenship. 
‘Citizenship-based mentality’ exists in a state where the members of 
the state identify themselves as members simply because they are citi-
zens, regardless of ethnic or religious afiliation. This term was used by 
scholars to describe the pre-war phase until 1992, at least with regard to 
the oficial state policy (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, 12). ‘Holy war’ 
and ‘religious war’ were concepts that all conlict parties used to justify 
the warfare and their use of violence, although to differing degrees. 
7.3. Actors 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a multi-dimensional conlict, 
involving a multitude of actors. In the name of simplicity, for this case 
study the actors with different perspectives but who were nonetheless 
on the same side, have not been differentiated, but include:
• Muslim Bosnians; 
• Orthodox Serbs; 
• Catholic Croatians; 
• local religious leaders; 
• international religious leaders;
• religious relief organisations; 
• Croatia; 
• Serbia; 
• international community (in particular NATO).
66 The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding //  British Academy
7.4. The role of religion in conflict and peace
Religion played a negative role in the conlict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with regard to the role of local religious leaders and of 
religious identities. Peace-promoting voices either did not exist or were 
not heard suficiently. Whereas the conlict was mainly about power 
and territorial issues, ethno-religious identity played a crucial role, both 
fuelling and maintaining it. The ‘centrality of identity-based conlict 
motives’ was a major factor in the conlict, which was exploited by 
both religious and political leaders (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, 
15). In the aftermath of and during the war, and even until now, the 
peacebuilding potential of religion has been underutilised and has come 
to the fore only through dissident voices. Substantial efforts could have 
been made to use the capacities of religion to the beneit of creating 
sustainable peace. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a prominent 
example of what some have called a ‘new war’, in which identity instead 
of ideology (as during the Cold War) underlies the politics of the conlict 
and where group identity is the cornerstone for mobilising popular 
support for it (Kaldor 2012). Three dimensions of the conlict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina need to be addressed for sustainable peacebuilding, 
namely identity, grievance, and power sharing (Kivimäki, Kramer 
and Pasch 2012). 
Long-standing historic conlicts that are centred on the questions 
of religious identity, as well as their exploitation by political leaders, 
have exacerbated the perceived cleavages among the different ethno-
religious groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The geopolitical location 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Christian and Muslim spheres of 
inluence have made it a battleground for centuries for both Christian 
and Muslim forces. Historical developments were perceived as unjust 
and impacted directly on the conlict dynamics (Kivimäki, Kramer and 
Pasch 2012). Before Yugoslavia fell apart, politics under its president, 
Josip Broz Tito, did not contribute to reducing religious and ethnic 
differences among its citizens, but simply obscured them (Patterson 
2013). Past injustices igured prominently in the public discourse and 
made it dificult to disconnect ethnicity from religion. This created 
a situation that could be easily exploited by political leaders. Most 
importantly, state-building efforts in Yugoslavia utterly failed, as Serb 
leaders ruled along ethno-religious lines instead of creating an all-
inclusive society, respectful of the multiple identities of its citizens. 
As a result, the citizens of ex-Yugoslavia continued to identify primarily 
along ethnic and religious lines. 
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Religion has played a ‘pivotal part in the ethnic identity of the three 
groups’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, 
17). This amalgam between religion and ethnicity does not in itself 
lead to conlict, but when the religious and political discourse takes 
an out-group/in-group approach rather than one with a universalist 
message of humanity, this amalgam exacerbates conlicts. Political 
leaders instrumentalised religion to help them achieve their own ethno-
nationalist objectives, justify war and also massive war crimes, including 
ethnic cleansing (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012), although the oficial 
state policy was to promote citizenship-based identities. A strong 
argument can be made that it was not religion that was at the origin 
of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather politics and power 
struggles and that the political parties, by involving religion in their 
politics, did nothing else but create ‘tension and hatred between the 
people’ (Stefanov 2012). The ethno-religious identities of Bosnian Serbs 
and Croats were strengthened and exploited for political objectives by 
their ‘homelands’, namely the former Yugoslavia and Republic of Croatia 
(Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, 16).
However, some argue that religion itself was the cause of the conlict. 
They use Huntington’s model (1993; 1997) of the clash of civilisations 
and argue that the Balkan countries constituted a series of intercon-
nected fault lines between the Western Christian, the Eastern Orthodox 
and the Islamic civilisations (Cline n.d.). Yet, these writers also admit 
that the presumed clash of civilisations in the Balkans could only happen 
because all three groups laid claim to the same territory, thus basically 
accepting that the main underlying conlict factor was a struggle about 
territory and power. Other scholars use a slightly modiied argument. 
For example, Robinson (2007) saw the conlict as ‘largely a religious 
one’. And Rubin (1999) claimed that ‘religious identity has been present 
constantly in the antagonisms that have fragmented the Balkans for 
centuries – setting neighbour against neighbour, Muslims against Or-
thodox Christians, and Orthodox Christians against Western Christians’. 
Current opinion polls show that today, the Croats in particular blame the 
Bosnian Serbs for ‘excessive inluence of religiousness on public life’ 
(Skoko 2010). Such a perception is fuel for potential conlict. 
Local and national religious leaders and groups played a negative role 
in exacerbating the conlict in Bosnia and Herzegovina by contributing 
to a radicalisation of the ethno-religious groups. For instance, Bosnian 
Serb religious leaders mobilised popular support for the punishment 
of secular leaders (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012). Non-Orthodox 
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Christian groups did not suficiently use their potential to promote peace 
either. International religious leaders played a prominent but at times 
negative role in the conlict. Eastern Orthodox churches fostered the 
kind of negative and destructive nationalism that fuelled and sustained 
the war; they indirectly supported war crimes by providing cover 
for war criminals such as Karadzic. The Catholic Church, in particular 
the Vatican, did not fully exercise its potential inluence over Croat 
leaders to mitigate tensions and ind peaceful solutions to the conlict. 
Foreign Muslim ighters, mostly from Afghanistan, provided military 
assistance to Bosniak forces (Patterson 2013). Religious leaders of all 
denominations failed to take advantage of the opportunities provided 
by the positive, peace-promoting messages of their religions, which: 
‘… had neglected … to engage in mourning, honestly confess the 
crimes which had been committed by all sides in the course of the 
centuries, and ask one another for mutual forgiveness … there can 
be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions!” 
(Küng and Kuschel 1993, 43–44). Reverend Professor Adrian Hastings 
of the University of Leeds, a leading Catholic historian, goes further, 
accusing the European religious community of having closed ‘its eyes 
to the tragedy unfolding in Bosnia’ (cited in Patterson 2013, 7). 
On the positive side, international religious organisations, in particular 
in the ield of humanitarian relief, have provided important assistance 
to war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina in the aftermath of the war, 
among them Islamic Relief, the United Methodist Committee On 
Relief (UMCOR), Catholic Social Services, Caritas and Benevoilencia 
(Patterson 2013, 7). Eurodiaconia, the Council of European Churches 
and the World Council of Churches have actively engaged in and 
promoted conlict resolution and peacebuilding in different forms at 
international, national and local levels. Youth organisations such as the 
Ecumenical Council of Europe and the Forum of European Muslim 
Youth and Student Organisations have launched their own and even joint 
initiatives, including training courses and seminars on conlict resolution 
and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina (as well as in other Balkan 
countries). Numerous independent Western, and particularly North 
American denominational organisations, have also engaged in conlict 
resolution and peacebuilding initiatives in the region with the use of 
interreligious dialogue as a main tool (Merdjanova and Brodeur 2010).
A number of local religious leaders and communities have only 
gradually started to talk and to work together on building sustainable 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the edited volume 
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on peacemakers by Little (2007) contains a story of Ivo Markovic, 
a Croatian Franciscan friar, who was engaged in conlict resolution and 
peacebuilding initiatives. Young people with religious devotion were 
found to be more likely than older generations to participate in conlict 
resolution and peacebuilding activities. In addition, women’s groups 
were more concerned with peacebuilding activities than were men’s. 
A few independent religious councils have also been established to 
help with conlict resolution between the religious communities and to 
facilitate interdenominational cooperation in peacebuilding (Merdjanova 
and Brodeur 2010). Based on an opinion survey, Wilkes et al (2013) argue 
that the commitment to a process of reconciliation directly correlates 
with the religiosity of the individual concerned. He notes that religious 
people prefer to focus more on dealing with issues relating to the 
past in the reconciliation process (such as creating public spaces of 
commemoration) than do less religious or non-religious individuals, 
who, in general, are more sceptical about reconciliation initiatives. 
Respondents in the survey also accorded greater importance to the 
involvement of women than men in the reconciliation process. No 
signiicant differences, however, could be identiied with regard to the 
importance of trust-building initiatives among all citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or of focusing on the future and the younger generations. 
On the role of gender in the conlict, women were disproportionately 
affected by the war. The most notorious example was the prevalence of 
rape, which was employed deliberately as a weapon of war. Importantly 
though, women have played a crucial role in peacebuilding initiatives. 
Scholars such as Zilka Spahic-Šiljak (2010, 2012, 2014) and Ina Merd-
janova (2013; with Brodeur 2010) discussed and observed the distinctive 
role of women in peacebuilding and conlict resolution. 
8. Conclusions
The vast body of literature and evidence on links between religion, 
conlict and peace does not point to the possibility of establishing 
a clear-cut model or theory for the relationship between these 
phenomena, nor does it provide simple recipes for promoting peace 
or avoiding war. However, this should not lead to the disillusioning 
conclusion that all is relative and contextual, nothing matters and 
nothing can be done. 
What does emerge clearly from the literature is that religion does 
matter in both preventing and resolving conlict, and in making and 
building peace, but it needs time to analyse the complex interplay and 
speciic articulations of religion in each individual context. This means 
taking a critical approach to the notion of religion that considers which 
aspects of the constellations of meanings associated with it are at 
play in each case. Shaped by history and context-dependent, religion is 
also culturally loaded, with shifting meanings that can include anything 
from sacred scriptures, to rituals, communal identity, norm-setting 
institutions, a focus on a deity or on the inner self.
There is no evidence to indicate that particular religious traditions are, 
by virtue of their theology, more prone to violence or more likely to lead 
to conlict or peace than others. However, attention can and should be 
paid to the underlying and enabling factors that make it possible for 
individuals, religious or political leaders, or communities to embrace 
a religious discourse, symbolism or institution to carry out or justify 
violence. Simultaneously, it is necessary to remain intellectually lexible 
and cognisant of the fact that religion is not always relevant in conlict 
or peace dynamics. 
The relationship between religion and conlict or peacebuilding is neither 
static nor one-dimensional. It is crucial not to impose secular Western 
parameters when evaluating situations of potential or actual conlict, and 
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developing policy responses for them. Contextual variables (historical, 
socio-economic, cultural) affect outcomes and thus no situation is identi-
cal to another, so even a most successful group or leader that was able 
to negotiate peace in one country may be unable to alleviate a conlict in 
a different country or in a different historical moment.
Religion matters in contemporary international affairs in essentially 
four ways.
1. It offers powerful views of cosmic order that often also generate 
political articulations. This is particularly evident in the monotheistic 
religions where there is an urge to connect transcendent beliefs to 
transform human life (in God’s ways) in the immanent world.
2. Religious beliefs, scriptures, rituals and symbols can easily become 
the foundation of ethnic or nationalist projects because they provide 
powerful narratives. But they can equally generate narratives of 
human dignity and reconciliation.
3. Religious actors comprise a variegated spectrum of ordinary 
individuals, leaders, grassroots movements, NGOs, transnational 
networks, and organised institutions. Hence the potential to engage 
with religion should not be limited to narrow hierarchical (Western-
centred) understandings of which people and groups constitute 
legitimate interlocutors.
4. Most religions are constructed around patriarchy and male 
leadership; this feature has not only had the effect of institutionally 
marginalising women and the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) community, but has also enabled the justiication or even 
perpetration of violence against these groups and to exaggerate 
masculine narratives of war and martyrdom. Contemporary Western 
emphasis on equality for women and LGBT rights can be contrasted 
with supposedly immutable traditional religious values (for whatever 
religious tradition) and thus rally sympathy for a cause from 
traditionally minded people who might otherwise be repelled by 
programmes of militant action in the name of religion.
The literature and the case studies presented here have addressed 
speciic features and dynamics involving religion in conlict and peace. 
The following conclusions can be drawn. 
Research on the causes of conlict, on faith-based terrorism and Islamic 
radicalisation is inconclusive in its attempts to identify patterns or 
variables such as poverty, personality traits, inequality or others that 
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can determine the degree to which one religious identity or another 
is prone to violent actions. Although it has been shown that religion 
can contribute to the escalation of conlicts, there is no ixed recipe 
for establishing which combination of actors, claims, external factors 
and religious features can ignite tensions and violence, where religious 
dimensions are central. 
Recognising the role of religion and engaging with its multiple facets 
do not replace the other work required to address the other interlocking 
issues (e.g. deprivation, marginalisation, institutional malfunctioning, 
state failure, global dynamics of dependency, etc.) related to conlict 
and peace. Even in those conlicts where religion appears to be a strong 
causal element, research shows that political manipulation of it rather 
than bodies of doctrine are what matters most. Quests for power and 
authority by opportunistic religious and political leaders are often behind 
their strategic mobilisation of community identities to aid them achieve 
their aims.
In diplomacy and peacemaking, emphasis has often been put on the 
potential of religion to promote transformation, rather than on delivering 
immediate solutions to conlicts. We have also learnt that involving faith 
in conlict resolution is not about converting the parties to a particular 
religion or abandoning secular international human rights standards that 
underpin peace processes. Rather, it is about reinforcing the path to 
peace and reconciliation with a religious grammar that is familiar to the 
actors involved and that enables them to fully engage in a process that 
also requires a degree of self-transformation.
9. Recommendations 
for policymakers and 
future research
The growing interest of the international community in the role of 
religion in conlict and peace is most welcome, but for it to proceed in 
concrete terms needed to understand and apply this perspective, the 
subject must be tackled with great sensitivity and nuance. The following 
recommendations for policymakers provide some general guidelines of 
how that might be accomplished successfully. 
• Religion is not a tangible and self-contained object and it would be 
reductive to try to understand it exclusively as a body of doctrines, 
a speciic institution, a particular person or group. Rather, it should 
be understood as a system of interlocking variables with a role that 
changes, shrinks and expands depending on a number of speciic 
circumstances, historical trajectories, and external factors.
• Secular and Western presuppositions and philosophies are still he-
gemonic ideas hindering a nuanced and full appreciation of religion, 
and in fact these can limit the deinitions that we use and the ap-
proaches that we take when encountering religion. 
• Caution should be taken not to overestimate the role of religion in 
conlict or peacemaking situations to the exclusion of other factors 
and dynamics involved.
• Similarly, it should be remembered that engagement with religion 
cannot be a substitute for other approaches to inding solutions 
to problems.
• Governments and diplomats should avoid taking a purely instrumen-
tal approach to religious communities, leaders and NGOs to ensure 
that the legitimacy of faith-based actors remains intact.
• Academically, there is no best or ideal methodology or discipline for 
acquiring a full understanding of what religion is and how it works. 
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Hence debates about the ‘scientiicity’ of quantitative versus qualita-
tive approaches for the study of religion are inappropriate.
• Instead, it is crucial that holistic approaches be encouraged and that 
a variety of disciplines continue to address the multiple aspects of 
this subject from different perspectives.
• Seeking to identify a cause and effect relationship between religion 
and violence, and between religion and peace, seems both use-
less and inappropriate. Although many studies have addressed how 
these factors interact in a multiplicity of contexts, no researcher has 
come up with a scientiic formula to predict when radicalisation hap-
pens or whether or how the outcomes of a war depend on religion.
• Recognising that religion can play a role in conlict and peace does 
not mean just searching for or consulting with faith-based NGOs or 
religious leaders because:
• There are many less visible ways in which religion can be 
woven into a particular context, for instance when it takes the 
shape of symbols or moral guidelines and decisions.
• There is a risk that the burden of solving crises would then 
be shifted onto their shoulders, while governments and 
the international community remain focused on inding 
solutions rather than accept their own responsibilities 
towards humanity.
• Because of the patriarchal imprint of most religions, their 
leaders tend to be men; thus, engaging with them exclusively 
would exclude by default other important segments of society.
• At the policy level, there is a need for great discernment to 
appreciate the ways in which different components of the 
broad phenomenon of religion come into play in conlicts, 
and to recognise those situations when religion is actually not 
a primary factor in them.
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The role of religion in conlict and peacebuilding has all too 
often been depicted in binary terms: it is seen as a source either 
of violence or of reconciliation. This simpliication obscures the 
complexity of the subject and shows that there is no common 
understanding of the central terms of the debate. Religion is never 
a static or isolated entity but should rather be understood as a luid 
system of variables, contingent upon a large number of contextual 
and historical factors. By observing how religion operates and 
interacts with other aspects of the human experience at the global, 
institutional, group and individual levels, this report aims to gain 
a more nuanced understanding of its role (or potential role) in 
both conlict and peacebuilding.
